

Conflict and Development

Many of the countries of the Western Balkans and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) during the past 15 years have had to respond to challenges of 'transition' in two key senses: as loci of great political and economic transformations, and as victims of costly military conflicts. Successfully negotiating the economic and political transitions in this region has proven difficult enough, even in countries not touched by military conflict. When military conflicts are present, the challenges facing policy makers and development practitioners can acquire truly daunting proportions—underscoring the importance of early warning and pre-emption of violent conflicts.

This issue of *Development and Transition* is devoted to these questions. It begins by reminding us that some potential conflicts in this region have indeed been averted—so far. In a special focus on Crimea, Gwendolyn Sasse argues that a combination of bargaining in national and local politics, backed up by effective development-based interventions by the international community, have forestalled the doomsday scenarios that were frequently predicted for the region in the early 1990s. The unresolved tensions associated with the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars, however, cast a long shadow over prospects for continued stability and development. As Sascha Graumann of UNDP's Crimean Integration and Development Programme points out, some of these tensions are intensifying, particularly in terms of legal, language, and land reform issues.

It is widely recognized that few countries in Europe have been as blighted by conflict as Serbia. However, successes in crisis prevention and post-conflict recovery in South Serbia are not so well known. In explaining these successes and pointing to some of their broader lessons, Tom Thorogood reminds us that well-targeted, area-based development programming

based on consensus among all relevant stakeholders can play a critical role in averting a conflict escalation.

Kosovo is perhaps the region's most complex challenge for stabilization, as some leading experts pointed out at an LSE forum earlier this year. Within the territory there are immense difficulties with post-conflict recovery, equal rights, security, and development opportunities. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations on Kosovo's final status, living conditions for Kosovo residents will deteriorate if they are not accompanied by institution-building efforts to improve governance on the ground. The article by Lundrim Aliu reviewing Kosovo's security sector illustrates the kinds of challenges facing policy makers in Kosovo.

Security sector reform issues go well beyond post-conflict development, as is evident in the analysis by Katrin Kinzelbach and Amrei Müller. UNDP is joining growing numbers of international organizations and NGOs that are helping to make military and security institutions more modern, transparent, and accountable to civilian and parliamentary oversight. In this way, countries in Europe and Central Asia can benefit from experience with security sector reforms that have been undertaken in other parts of the world. UNDP's Transitional Justice Team suggests that the post-conflict countries of this region—particularly the Western Balkans—can likewise benefit from transitional justice initiatives, in order to reconcile the avoidance of collective guilt with the need for justice and reconciliation.

The European Union is becoming a major actor in conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery. Stefan Wolff observes that this results in part from the EU's growing prominence in the international development and security architecture, and also reflects the 'soft power' of prospective EU accession. The 'European anchor' is a key conflict prevention tool for the region—but its application is less feasible outside of Europe where the prospect of eventual EU accession can not help turn swords into ploughshares.

Ben Slay and James Hughes

Crimea: Conflict-Prevention through Institution-Making	Gwendolyn Sasse	2
Crimea: From Conflict Prevention to Development	Sascha Graumann	4
The South Serbia Programme: Lessons in Conflict Prevention and Recovery	Tom Thorogood	7
The Kosovo Precedent? Implications for Frozen Conflicts	James Hughes, Florian Bieber, Bruno Coppieters	9
Kosovo's Security Sector Review	Lundrim Aliu	12
Enhancing Human Security through Civilian Oversight	Katrin Kinzelbach & Amrei Müller	14
Transitional Justice in the Balkans	UNDP Transitional Justice Team	16
EU Crisis Management in the Western Balkans	Stefan Wolff	17

Crimea: Conflict-Prevention through Institution- Making

Gwendolyn Sasse

Regional diversity is one of Ukraine's most important characteristics. Regional diversity often embodies potential for friction and conflict, in particular when it involves territorialized ethnicity and divergent historical experiences. Political elites interested in stability and conflict-prevention must find ways to accommodate or control this diversity. Crimea was Ukraine's most immediate and most serious centre-periphery challenge at the fall of communism. The multiethnic composition of Crimea, with a majority Russian population and significant Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar minorities, created a widespread perception of Crimea as 'a fateful peninsula' that was prone to conflict in the early to mid-1990s.¹ In July 1993, *The Economist* dramatically warned of a "long-running, acrimonious, possibly bloody and conceivably nuclear, dispute over Crimea."² Alarmist comparisons were also drawn with the wars in the former Yugoslavia and Kashmir.

Commentators pointed to a range of factors that are generally closely associated with the risk of conflict: the difficulty of reconciling competing historical and cultural claims to territory, a multi-ethnic society, demands for regional autonomy, the capacity for secession due to a peripheral location, depressed socioeconomic conditions (a bankrupt military-industrial complex, a once well-developed Soviet tourism industry that collapsed together with the Soviet Union, and a lack of energy and water resources), and the potentially destabilizing influence of external actors. In particular, Russian nationalists challenged the legality of Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea given that the region had been transferred from the jurisdiction of the RSFSR to Ukrainian SSR in 1954 by the then Soviet leadership in a largely non-transparent process. Moreover, the issue of the division of the Black Sea Fleet, stationed off the coast of Sevastopol, increased the tension in Russian-Ukrainian relations. These risk factors were operating during a transition period when institutions, power relations, and access to resources were undergoing a fundamental reordering.

A build-up of events in the early 1990s caused a spiral of mounting tension: Crimea's referendum on autonomy in 1991, the establishment of an administrative autonomous

region in early 1991 at a time when other Soviet-era autonomies were being dismantled in the context of the disintegration of the USSR, the return of over 200,000 Crimean Tatars to the region from which they had been deported under Stalin in 1944, and the rise of a Russian separatist movement in Crimea that peaked in 1994 and was fuelled by the rhetoric of Russian politicians in Moscow.

However, predictions of conflict in Crimea did not materialize. Incidents have been limited to a small number of clashes between Crimean Tatars and the local authorities or Slav youths. Kyiv has managed to integrate Crimea into the new Ukrainian polity. How did this happen, given the host of regional characteristics typically associated with conflict and a complex post-communist transition process?

The analysis of a widely expected conflict that did *not* occur is not the usual approach in conflict studies. However, understanding why conflicts do *not* occur is as important as analysing those that do, especially if the conflict potential includes the principal structural conditions that are typically regarded as the main causes of conflict.

The key to conflict-prevention in Crimea was the process of negotiating and formulating the region's autonomous status. Here the institutional *process* was more important than the final institutional *outcome*, the weakly empowered Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution of 1996 and the Crimean constitution of 1998. Conflict has been avoided in Crimea not so much because of the institution of autonomy as such, but because of the lengthy elite bargaining process involving national and regional elites that preceded the constitutional settlement. Elites at the national level kept open the political space for Crimean autonomy to be institutionalized. The centre was unable to expunge the idea of autonomy which had been supported broadly by Crimean political forces from the early 1990s.

Institutional linkages between central and regional elites were also forged by participation in the democratic transition. A total of 10 regional and national elections, plus a regional and a national referendum, were held in the period 1991 - 2002. While these elections shifted legitimacy back and forth between the regional and the national level of government, they steadily and peacefully secured Crimea's gradual political integration into the Ukrainian polity.

Four key background conditions provided a favourable environment for resolving constitutional issues at the

national and regional level in Ukraine. First, Crimea's multi-ethnicity has prevented a clear-cut ethnopolitical polarization. Even at its peak, the regional Russian movement mobilized against the Ukrainian centre in Kyiv rather than against ethnic Ukrainians (mostly Rus-sophones) living in Crimea. A territorial cleavage, consequently, was at the centre of political mobilization.

Second, Russian secessionist mobilization in Crimea proved unsustainable because of the inability of the movement's leadership to address the bread-and-butter issues of the region's socioeconomic problems, its lack of unity, and the vagueness of its goals. The "Russian idea" in Crimea has always been reflected in a plethora of "Russian" organizations. The intense political activity of well-organized Crimean Tatars presents a sharp counterpoint to the fragmentation of the Russian movement. The experience of ethnocide and ethnic discrimination has strengthened Crimean Tatar identity and united the community across different social strata and political and economic interests, and has guaranteed them representation in the regional assembly in the absence of electoral quota arrangements. The Russian secessionist movement, in contrast, was constructed around a confused Soviet-Russian identity with blurred political goals. Crimean Russians have been broadly in favour of improved links or integration with Russia, but there is no strong secessionist sentiment.

Third, the central elites in Kyiv chose a pragmatic approach and opted to bargain over cultural and linguistic concerns in Crimea rather than pursue an uncompromising Ukrainization strategy. Once the Russian separatist movement self-destructed in Crimea in 1994, Kyiv took the advantage and stabilized the region with a policy of institutional compromise. The principle of autonomy was conceded but not elaborated. By the time the status was finally inscribed in the constitutions of 1996 and 1998, regionalist and separatist movements had weakened and moved to the margins of politics.

Fourth, neither of the main external governmental actors, Russia and Turkey, actively supported regional political mobilization in Crimea. Crimea's status may have been an issue in Russian domestic politics, but it has not been a major foreign policy concern, with the exception of the Black Sea Fleet issue. In any event, Russia's attention during the key period of Crimean secessionist mobilization in the mid-1990s lay elsewhere, due to the military intervention in Chechnya. OSCE and UN mediation and integration programmes further internationalized the Crimean issue. Western involvement, especially under the auspices of the first OSCE High

Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, helped to maintain the momentum for a constitutional settlement and to overcome the frequent stalemates during the protracted negotiations. Ukraine's agreements with Russia, especially on Ukraine's territorial integrity and Russia's leasing of the bases in Sevastopol, also helped to defuse differences over Crimea.

The Crimean case demonstrates that regional diversity, even when politicized, need not destabilize a state. It also shows that, in a regionally diverse country, ethnicity is just one cleavage among many others available for political mobilization. However, while the process of autonomy-making in Crimea has contributed to the prevention of conflict, it has rendered the regional political economy of transition more complicated. Political mobilization and the attempts to defuse it have diverted attention from regional structural reforms and acted as a vehicle for the criminalization of Crimea's economy. Moreover, the final autonomy status has had little to offer in terms of the Crimean Tatars' demands for recognition and representation or effective participation in regional policy-making more generally.



Celebrating diversity: an ethnic Russian, Crimean Tatar, and Ukrainian in traditional dress.

In comparison with most other regional and ethnic conflicts in post-communist transitions, in which coercion and military force have been the norm, Ukraine's management of the Crimean issue has had a distinct character. The Crimean experience supports the claim that institutions and elites play significant roles in transition and conflict prevention. We should be more cautious, however, about the role of institutional *design*: has Crimean autonomy prevented conflict in the region, or has autonomy resulted from the weakness of separatism and nationalism? This question is not easy to answer

definitively. Crimea's final autonomy status is symbolically significant but weak in terms of powers. It is part of an asymmetric arrangement in Ukraine that *de facto* perforates the unitary state set out in the 1996 constitution. Although there is a fair amount of scepticism about Crimean autonomy in Ukraine, there is a consensus that the removal of the region's constitutionally guaranteed status would be destabilizing (as has been the case with the de-institutionalization of autonomous regions in the Caucasus, for example). The Crimean experience underscores the importance of regional and national constitution-making processes, involving changing sets of actors and institutional compromises, as key determinants of conflict-prevention, rather than the actual institutional outcome *per se*. This finding should be of relevance to other pre-conflict situations as well as attempts to manage hot conflict through institution-making.

However, the description of Crimea as a conflict that did not happen needs to be qualified. To date, various conflicts have been prevented in Crimea: a clash between

Ukraine and Russia, intraregional political conflict among different ethnopolitical groups, internecine conflict among the Crimean Russian elites, and a centre-periphery conflict between Kyiv and Simferopol. A fourth potential for conflict involving the Crimean Tatar minority has only temporarily and intermittently been stabilized. The political and social integration of the Crimean Tatars is far from complete and remains one of –if not *the*– key risk factors for the future stability of Crimea.

Gwendolyn Sasse is a Senior Lecturer in Comparative European Politics at the London School of Economics and Deputy Editor of *Development and Transition*. She is the author of *The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict*, Harvard University Press, 2007 (forthcoming).

1. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, Russians accounted for 58.3 percent of the Crimean population, Ukrainians for 24.3 percent, the Crimean Tatars for 12 percent, followed by about 80 other smaller national minorities (see <http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/>). By comparison, the last Soviet census in 1989 recorded 67 percent Russians, 25.8 percent Ukrainians and only 1.6 percent Crimean Tatars.

2. *The Economist*, 17 July 1993, p. 38.

Crimea: From Conflict Prevention to Development

Sascha Graumann

The largely peaceful return and resettlement of over 260,000 Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups, which were deported by the Soviet government to Central Asia and Siberia in 1944 for alleged collaboration with Nazi Germany, is a major achievement in recent Crimean history. It attests to the capacity of Crimean society to accommodate the views and interests of different ethnic and religious groups,¹ and is a foundation on which lasting stability in Crimea can be built. However, a definitive solution to the challenges facing Crimea will require continued commitment from all stakeholders in Ukraine, as well as continued external support. Ironically, because it has managed to avoid the escalating tensions that led to conflicts (now frozen) in Transdnistria, South Ossetia, and other CIS territories, Crimea has gradually lost international attention since the early 1990s.

Since the late 1980s the deported people have been returning to an economically depressed region that

has been unprepared to handle such a large and rapid migratory influx.² Tensions over access to employment, resources, and social services in Crimea have played on negative stereotypes and prejudices concerning Crimean Tatars that were nurtured over several generations.

Current situation

As Sasse points out in the companion article on pp. 2-4, the management of ethnic and other tensions in Crimea has been quite successful on the whole. Recent trends, however, give cause for concern. Violent clashes between some 800 people around a local market in Bakhchisaray in August 2006, a tripling in the unauthorized occupation of land during the past year (from 19 to 53 sites), confrontations with sectarian overtones in Feodosia and Alushta, and increasing numbers of people (64 percent as compared with 21 percent in 2002) who, according to public opinion polls, feel that inter-ethnic relations are getting worse—all this underscores the depth of social cleavages and perceived injustices in Crimea. Disillusionment with central governments, especially the Orange team, and particularly in terms of lack of progress on land distribution, language issues, the rights of deported peoples, and unequal socio-economic development, has led to rising impatience among the Crimean Tatars. The radical elements within the Tatar and Russian communities are now grow-

ing.³ The radicals argue that dialogue has failed and more forceful measures are needed.

Risk factors

Many of the Crimean Tatars' problems are linked to perceptions of ethnic identity and of historical injustice.

Land disputes: Tensions over the administrative allocation of land under the Ukrainian land code have become more acute, exacerbating the incidence of land squatting.⁴ On 13 December 2006, the Ukrainian Parliament amended the criminal code to prohibit the unauthorized occupation of land, making land-squatting punishable by up to 6 years' imprisonment. Tensions also arise from the fact that Crimean Tatar land squatting often occurs in areas in which they formerly lived, and which are now desirable and expensive parts of the Southern Coast and around Simferopol. In anticipation of this market value, Crimean Tatars intensified their land seizures, which now involve some 15,000 people (up from 8,000 in April 2006). According to pronouncements by some Crimean Tatar groups, attempts to enforce the ban on land squatting will be opposed

equal opportunities for the deported people—rather than full property restitution). In the absence of a fully functioning land registration system,⁷ it is difficult to ascertain the correct number of Crimean Tatars that do not have access to land.

Two inter-related factors are behind these disputes: the lack of a properly functioning land administration system (which allows the local authorities to allocate land in a quasi-arbitrary manner); and the willingness of Tatars to engage in land-squatting in protest against their perceived exclusion from land allocation decisions. According to the Mejlis, Crimean Tatars are being denied access to land in the places where they used to live prior to deportation, including areas of symbolic importance in Tatar culture, while large land-holdings on the expensive Southern Coast are being acquired by oligarchs from Russia or Ukraine (or their companies). The authorities in turn complain that their attempts to provide land to those in need are jeopardized by duplicitous land claims by some people (including squatters), who seek to acquire land in different places for speculative resale purposes.



Courtesy LSE Design Unit

by 'any available means', including active resistance, demonstrations, and demands to legalize the ownership of houses that have already been constructed on these lands. Crimean Tatar leaders have also threatened to escalate their demands to cover the restitution of all property owned prior to their deportation, rather than simply the right to return to areas where they used to live.⁵ (Thus far, the Crimean Tatar Mejlis⁶ has limited its demands to 'social justice'—understood as

Status: The fact that the status of being a 'formerly deported person' (or a descendant of such a person) is not legally defined has created difficulties in setting up clear rules for restoring what the Crimean Tatar leadership calls 'social justice'. Attempts to pass legislation to clarify legal status or returnees' social rights⁸ have failed. Most recently, national legislation (which many Crimean Tatars regard as far from adequate) was vetoed by President Leonid Kuchma in 2004; similar legislation has not made it out of parliament since President Viktor Yushchenko's inauguration in 2005.

Language rights: The issue of language rights is a significant mobilizing force in Crimean politics. According to public opinion surveys, 85 percent of the ethnic Russian population and 73 percent of the Crimean Tatar population are concerned about threats to their respective language rights.⁹ On 18 October 2006, the Crimean parliament adopted a resolution requesting that the Ukrainian parliament conduct a national referendum on making Russian a state language.¹⁰ The Tatar Mejlis argues that, during the last 15 years, only 15 Crimean Tatar schools and five Ukrainian schools have been opened in Crimea, representing 3 percent and 1 percent (respectively) of total schools. By contrast, Tatars constitute some 12 percent of the population, while Ukrainians constitute 24 percent. In short, the language issue, which

features prominently in the programme of nearly every political group in Crimea, is being used for ethnic mobilization by all sides.

Socio-economic disparities: Land, legal, linguistic, and ethnic tensions are occurring against a background of socio-economic difficulties, especially in rural areas. Crimea has some of the highest poverty levels in Ukraine,¹¹ and suffers from socio-economic cleavages that interact in subtle but potentially explosive ways with ethnic and other perceived inequalities. Public opinion data indicate that 54 percent of Crimean Tatars feel that their living standards are below those of other Crimeans (41 percent feel it is the same), whereas 66 percent of ethnic Russians believe that Crimean Tatar living standards are higher than theirs (23 percent feel it is the same).¹² These data reflect the widespread perception among the ethnic Russian population that Crimean Tatars receive undeserved preferential treatment from the Ukrainian government.

Actors

While the ARC government and the Crimean Tatar Mejlis have been engaging in dialogue to resolve incidents of tension and avoid their escalation, capacity for developing more systematic solutions to the underlying causes of ethnic tensions remains inadequate. Moreover, while the Mejlis has thus far been able to accommodate both radical and moderate factions, recent developments point to growing popular support for more radical alternatives and a loss of authority by moderates. For example, only about half of the Crimean Tatars followed the Mejlis's voting recommendations during Ukraine's March 2006 parliamentary elections.¹³

The Crimea Integration and Development Programme

As a joint initiative of the international donor community¹⁴, UNDP's Crimea Integration and Development Programme (CIDP) has since 1995 been responding to these risk factors. Over 150,000 people have been engaged in or benefited from CIDP projects that have worked across ethnic lines to increase access to rural water and gas supply, health facilities, schools, and rural roads. Income generation and rural development projects also constitute a growing part of the CIDP portfolio. Wherever possible, CIDP projects are accompanied by policy recommendations and advocacy in the areas of public service reform, strategic public sector planning, and public expenditure management. At the request of the Crimean Human Security Council,¹⁵ the CIDP has completed an extensive assessment of the problems with land administration and titling, and proposed measures to increase transparency in the land allocation process, avoid speculative land claims, and thereby reduce the frequency of land-squatting. The CIDP is also supporting the development of bi-/tri-lingual education policies, based on experience from dozens of rural school projects.

All in all, some \$16 million have been invested in the CIDP, a sum that has been leveraged by growing amounts of co-financing from local communities, municipalities, and the Crimean government. This track record allows the CIDP to engage in regular policy dialogue with the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and parliament. Beyond the concrete impact of the development assistance itself, CIDP activities for many beneficiaries symbolize the international community's commitment to ensuring that Crimea's conflict potential remains latent.

Sascha Graumann is International Programme Coordinator for UNDP's Crimea Integration and Development Programme.

Sascha Graumann is International Programme Coordinator for UNDP's Crimea Integration and Development Programme.

1. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, Russians accounted for 58.3 percent of the Crimean population, Ukrainians for 24.3 percent, the Crimean Tatars for 12 percent, followed by about 80 other smaller national minorities (see <http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/>).
2. Crimea has some of the highest poverty levels in Ukraine (cf. *Ukraine Poverty Assessment*, World Bank, December 2005: 10 et seq.). According to national and World Bank statistics, some 21.6 percent of the population of the Black Sea region (which includes Crimea) in 2003 was living below the poverty line, compared with 19 percent for Ukraine as a whole.
3. These include pro-Russian paramilitary Cossack units and allegedly fundamentalist Islamic organizations such as Hizbu Tahir, and 'Wahabis'.
4. Ukraine's Land Code (2001) recognizes "administrative land allocation" as a constitutional principle. According to this principle, all citizens are entitled to receive land plots from the state free of charge. Responsibilities for transferring titles to specific plots of land lie with local government bodies.
5. Report of Mustafa Jemilev, Mejlis Chairman, at the 5th session of the IVth Kurultai, 22 December 2006.
6. The Mejlis is an unofficial representative structure of the Crimean Tatars elected by the Kurultai, the Assembly of the Crimean Tatars.
7. Only 260,000 of the estimated 800,000 land owners in Crimea have registered titles.
8. Law of Ukraine on the restoration of the rights of people deported based on their ethnic background, June 2004.
9. Crimean Human Security Monitoring System: *Monitoring Report*, September 2006.
10. Supporters often base their claims on the European Charter on Minority and Regional Languages. However, the Council of Europe considers the provisions of the Charter inapplicable because the Charter only "obliges the state not to let the language die", which is not the case with Russian.
11. *Ukraine Poverty Assessment*, World Bank, December 2005: 10 et seq.
12. Crimean Human Security Monitoring System: *Monitoring Report*, September 2005.
13. The Mejlis usually aligns itself with President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party during electoral campaigns, and recommends that Crimean Tatars vote accordingly. While in previous years the vast majority of Crimean Tatars followed this recommendation, only some 60,000 – 70,000 out of the 105,000 Tatar voters did so during the parliamentary elections in March 2006.
14. Currently supported by the governments of Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
15. The Crimean Human Security Council was established in 2001 with support from CIDP. Recently, it was formalized as an Advisory Council under the Speaker of the Crimean Parliament. The Council brings together key government officials, MPs and other political leaders representing Crimea's different ethnic and political groups.

The South Serbia Programme: Lessons in Conflict Prevention and Recovery

Tom Thorogood

On 21 January, Serbia went to the polls to elect a new parliament in what is likely to be the first of several elections in 2007. International attention focused largely on the seats won by various parties, and the implications for coalition governments and Serbia's European integration prospects. Less attention was paid to the fact that, for the first time since 1997, when large numbers of Albanians voted for the PVD,¹ ethnic Albanians living in South Serbia participated in national elections. This is a remarkable turnaround from the situation in late 2000 and early 2001, when a localized insurgency in the Presevo Valley seemed likely to plunge much of South Serbia into conflict. Although many of the underlying causes have still to be fully addressed, the successful management of this conflict is largely due to the leadership of South Serbia's local Albanian communities, the Serbian government, and a quick and effective response by the international community. This article focuses on drawing some conclusions from the South Serbia experience that could be applied more generally to area-based development programming in conflict-affected regions.

The origins and course of the conflict in South Serbia

South Serbia's Albanian population is concentrated in the municipalities of Presevo and Bujanovac (where Albanians comprise the majority) and Medvedja. Since the early 1990s, ethnic Albanians were under-represented in state administration and enterprises that are the main employers in the region, and were almost completely absent from the police and judiciary. This discrimination exacerbated tensions associated with poverty and unemployment in South Serbia, particularly in rural areas.

Facing abuse and harassment from the Yugoslav security forces and emboldened by the successes of the Kosovo Liberation Army in neighbouring Kosovo, the UCPMB² Albanian insurgents fought Yugoslav security forces in 2000. The ensuing conflict lasted for some 18 months during 2000-2001 (after the Kosovo conflict, roughly simultaneously with the Albanian insurgency in neighbouring Macedonia), and produced some 100 casualties. Attacks on Yugoslav police and military patrols by small groups of UCPMB fighters, who then took refuge in the 'ground safe-

A chronology of the conflict in South Serbia and its immediate aftermath

- Mid-2000: The first armed clashes take place.
- December 2000: The Serbian government establishes the Coordination Body for Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac (in Bujanovac), to address the security situation in South Serbia.
- February 2001: A UNDP-led inter-agency UN mission visits the region.
- May 2001: The Yugoslav army begins a phased reoccupation of the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ).
- May 2001: The Konculj peace agreement is signed.
- May 2001: The Covic plan is launched. (This is a detailed blueprint for the development of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, written by the then Deputy Premier and President of the Coordination Body Nebojsa Covic. The Coordination Body took the lead in coordinating the implementation of the plan.)
- May 2001: UNDP establishes an office in the region.
- August 2001: The first group of trained multi-ethnic police becomes operational in the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja.
- August 2002: An Albanian is elected mayor of Bujanovac (for the first time).
- February 2006: An Albanian judge is appointed to the Bujanovac municipal court.
- November 2006: The municipalities of Bujanovac, Medvedja, and Presevo participate in the establishment of a regional development agency, along with 10 other (non-Albanian) South Serbian municipalities.



ty zone' (GSZ) (an area inside Serbia but barred to Yugoslav forces),³ were common. The signing of the Konculj peace agreement in May 2001 essentially halted the fighting, though isolated incidents of violence continued until the end of 2004.

Lessons from South Serbia

While such conflicts in the Western Balkans are often portrayed as reflecting racial, ethnic, or religious cleavages, they can also result from tensions between an ethnic minority and state institutions. This was the case in South Serbia. In contrast to other parts of the Western Balkans, the conflict in South Serbia did not escalate to the point in which Albanian and Serbian neighbours and communities took up arms against one another. In fact, relationships between local people remained relatively good throughout the conflict.

The South Serbia experience also underscores the importance of the willingness of the 'warring parties' to negotiate with one another, and of a rapid, effective response by the international community. This included:

- **A quick response that yields visible, tangible benefits for some of the main conflict protagonists.** By the end of 2001, the UN had established an inter-agency office in South Serbia, and the implementation of the South Serbia Municipal Improvement and Recovery Programme (SSMIRP) and the Rapid Employment Programme (REP) had begun. The REP provided temporary public works employment for some 6,000 former fighters and the long-term unemployed during an 18-month period. The SSMIRP focused on such longer term issues as the expansion of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) needed for conflict resolution, civil society development, sustainable employment creation, and better local governance. This included the establishment of small funds administered by municipalities that delivered grants to NGOs from the region. Another important activity was work on the development of farmers groups and cooperatives.
- **Appropriate UN support.** The UNDP-led inter-agency mission to South Serbia in February 2001 prepared the groundwork for future fund raising and gathered the background knowledge needed for initial programme design and implementation. This was followed by the recruitment of a former UN resident coordinator—an experienced, respected individual—as the manager of UNDP's South Serbia programme, who provided strategic leadership during the programme's crucial initial phase. Timely financial and technical assistance was also provided by UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. This support was combined with extensive operational autonomy, allowing the South Serbia programme to flexibly respond to changing circumstances on the ground.
- **Extensive local visibility.** The UN's presence and visibility, especially in some of South Serbia's more remote rural areas, reassured many local communities, helping to reduce fears and tensions.
- **Impartiality.** By working broadly across the region and among all parties to the conflict, instead of just focusing on the municipalities most directly affected by the conflict, the South Serbia programme helped local stakeholders to effectively combine conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery activities. This may well seem obvious; however, it has not often been the case. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo are all examples of places where the development community, at least initially, supported one side in post conflict/conflict situations.
- **Employing and investing in local staff from different ethnic communities.** In addition to reinforcing the programme's impartiality, such personnel policies helped promote local ownership of the South Serbia programme. (Programme offices in post-conflict regions often have many local staff who are not from the region itself, or who have been parachuted in from headquarters.)
- **Effective international coordination.** The South Serbia programme has benefited from an effective division of labour among the international agencies active in the region. Whereas UNDP has focused on programming in governance, civil society and (to a lesser degree) local economic development, OSCE has taken a leading role on judicial and police reform. Likewise, the monitoring of the security situation has fallen under the mandate of the European Monitoring Mission (EUMM). While areas of overlap have been present (among other things between UNDP- and USAID-funded initiatives), these overlaps were increasingly managed in a coordinated manner. The strong donor support enjoyed by the various UNDP-implemented initiatives in South Serbia have resulted in the delivery of 10.5 million euros through the European Union and \$3.5 million through other donors such as the World Bank, UNDP, and the governments of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Sweden during the period 2001 - 2005. The MIR2⁴ programme that began in December 2005 has a portfolio of 10.2 million euros and is supported by a consortium made up of the European

Union through the European Agency for Reconstruction, the Swedish government, the Norwegian government, the Austrian government and the Serbian government. There have also been large contributions by local stakeholders in many of the initiatives that by the end of 2005 totalled another \$2 million. The coordination among donors has helped ensure funding continuity since 2001, and prevented the appearance of serious funding gaps.

- **From recovery to development.** External evaluations have been performed at key points in the programme cycle, helping to identify problems and make necessary adjustments. These evaluations led to the 2003 decision to merge the REP and SSMIRP programmes into the Municipal Improvement and Revival programme which covers all municipalities in South Serbia,⁵ and is now in its second phase. They also facilitated a gradual shift in the South Serbia programme's focus towards local governance and local economic development, away from conflict resolution (which nonetheless remains a cross-cutting issue).

Signs of success ... and remaining challenges

These activities have clearly helped to reduce tensions in South Serbia, thus helping the region to move from recovery to development. Tangible examples of these changes include the establishment of a multi-ethnic police force (2001), the election of an Albanian mayor (2002), the appointment of an Albanian judge (2006) in Bujanovac, and the participation of the Bujanovac, Medvedja, and Presevo municipalities in the establishment of a regional development agency, along with 10 other (non-Albanian) municipalities, in November 2006. The region's infrastructure has visibly improved since the conflict ended with many of the schools having been rebuilt and refurbished, significant improvement in the roads of the region, development of economic infrastructure such as livestock and green markets in many of the towns in the region and a considerable investment in less visible infrastructure such as sewage and water supply.

However, many of the issues that originally precipitated the conflict have still not been fully addressed. Unemployment remains a particular concern: official data report unemployment rates as high as 40 percent in some parts of South Serbia. Along with the uncertainties surrounding the future of neighbouring Kosovo and internecine conflict amongst Albanian politicians (reflected in a political struggle between the moderates who argue for engagement and continued dialogue with the Belgrade government and the extremists who call for making the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja part of Kosovo), South Serbia's conflict potential suggests that the involvement of UNDP and other international organizations will be needed for the foreseeable future.

Tom Thorogood is Programme Manager for the Municipal Improvement and Revival Programme Phase II in South Serbia.

1. Partia për veprim demokratik (The Party for Democratic Action).
2. The Movement for the Liberation of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac.
3. This is a five-kilometre strip of land on the border with Kosovo. Serbian security forces were not permitted to cross this zone under the terms of the 1999 ceasefire agreement that ended the fighting in Kosovo.
4. Municipal Improvement and Revival Programme Phase II.
5. This consists of the municipalities of Bojnik, Crna Trava, Lebane, Leskovac, Medvedja and Vlasotince, which make up Jablanica district, and the municipalities of Bosilegrad, Bujanovac, Presevo, Surdulica, Trgoviste, Vladicin Han and Vranje, which make up Pcinja District. Together these two districts make up South Serbia.



The Kosovo Precedent? Implications for Frozen Conflicts

A panel discussion was held at the London School of Economics, 22 January 2007, with Dr. Florian Bieber, University of Kent, and Prof. Bruno Coppieters, Vrije Universiteit Brussels, chair Dr. James Hughes, London

School of Economics/Editor of Development and Transition. Summary provided by Dr. Hughes.

One day after the Serb elections and in the run-up to the release of the UN report on the future status of Kosovo, two experts on post-communist conflicts discussed the implications of what was widely expected to be the main conclusion of the report: some form of 'conditional independence' for Kosovo, with continued international involvement.



The Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Kosovo's future status process, Martti Ahtisaari, holds a press conference at UNMIK Headquarters in Pristina (Photo: UNMIK/DPI).

The chair, Dr. James Hughes, introduced the debate by reminding the audience that the current Kosovo question has its origins in the compromise included in the agreement to end the war between NATO and what was then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999, whereby Kosovo was placed under UN administration while the Security Council reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. Negotiations to determine the final status of Kosovo reached a climax in 2006, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's special envoy Martti Ahtisaari. Ahtisaari's recommendations were presented shortly after the panel discussion; no agreement between the parties has yet emerged.

Kosovo's status as a territory under UN administration is very unusual in that, until 1999, such territories were generally very underdeveloped and located outside Europe. Indeterminate and other kinds of special status are not so unusual for disputed territories, and are associated with the most protracted conflicts. By contrast, the international system only rarely recognizes secessions resulting from conflict without the consent of the sovereign state power. However, the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s offered a series of such cases and Kosovo is certainly, if belatedly, a member of this group.

International lawyers increasingly recognize that secession without consent under certain conditions (e.g., to escape systemic human rights violations) may be desirable. However, most political science experts on conflict are deeply sceptical about whether secession can usefully end problems of 'stateness' and ethnic conflict. As Donald Horowitz put it "secession is almost never an answer to such problems and...is likely to make them worse" (Horowitz, 2003: 5).

The EU and United States are leading the push for Kosovo's independence, with or without the consent of Serbia (the leading FRY successor state). Western diplomats frame the issue as one that is 'sui generis' and without implications for other conflicts. Russia and some other states involved in the 'frozen conflicts' of the former Soviet Union, however, believe that the resolution in Kosovo will set a precedent for these conflicts. President Putin has repeatedly stated that the outcome in Kosovo will establish 'common principles' for dealing with 'frozen conflicts'.

Dr. Bieber began by questioning the concept of 'conditional independence' itself, asking whether a political entity could be 'a little independent' rather than fully independent. He observed that many countries are actually interdependent and operate under forms of 'conditional sovereignty'. Moreover, 'conditional independence' for Kosovo would not be unusual within the region itself: in the notable example of Bosnia-Herzegovina, institutional arrangements are guaranteed by external powers and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) has many governmental and law-making powers. Given the political sensitivities of the issue, one outcome might be that the term 'independence' is not employed in Ahtisaari's report. Whatever term is employed, Bieber noted, the intent would be to remove Kosovo from Serbian sovereignty.

Bieber then explored the issue from four perspectives: what would it mean for Kosovo, Serbia, the region, and for secession more broadly? He pointed out that independence would most likely result in a further outflow of the ethnic Serb minority population, currently numbering around 5-6 percent of Kosovo's total. The ethnic Serbs are fragmented into Northern and Central enclaves. He saw the major questions for the internal government of Kosovo as being how to ensure there was no further outflow of Serbs, and how the Serb minority can be integrated. There were a number of options, ranging from the most probable – including institutional forms of autonomy and power-sharing – to the least likely, a 'secession within a secession' or some form of partition. He surmised that the continued international presence in Kosovo might be modelled on the EU presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with an OHR functional equivalent, but the model would not be simply transplanted. Over recent months there had been a concerted effort by the UN and EU to 'deflate' the Kosovar independence 'myth' and to prepare the ground for an outcome that was in the near term far short of outright independence.

Bieber suggested that the Serbian response would be hostile, but would be characterized by 'rhetorical resistance'. Kosovo was only a third- or fourth-ranking issue in Serbia's parliamentary elections in January, which were dominated by socio-economic issues. Some smaller parties, such as the Liberals (LDP), which won about 5 percent of the vote, openly accept the independence of Kosovo. It was almost universally recognized inside and outside Serbia that Kosovo's independence would not have any 'domino' effect on Presevo, or Vojvodina. In terms of the region as a whole, Bieber considered that independence for Kosovo would assist with broader stabilization. It would be a

useful way to close off any further territorial questions or separations, especially in Macedonia and Republika Srpska. The main lesson he drew from the Kosovo experience was that functioning state institutions cannot be built in the absence of a status decision, and that the international community had made a serious mistake by delaying the decision for many years.

Prof. Coppieters broadened the discussion beyond the Western Balkan context. He deconstructed the notion of Kosovo being a 'unique' case for secession. The question of the status of Kosovo is a direct result of NATO's unilateral military intervention in 1999 without the approval of the UN Security Council. This kind of action in support of a secessionist entity is not so unusual historically. There have been other notable cases of attempts to alter states by outside and unilateral military intervention. What is unique about the Kosovo case is that Western states appear to be successfully asserting their power to secure secession.

What is further distinctive about Kosovo is the official Western position that federalism is not appropriate to resolve the consequences of such a violent conflict. In contrast many Western states advocate federalism as an 'internal' solution in other post-communist 'frozen conflicts' in Georgia or Moldova. This preference had been sustained despite the fact that the federalism solutions on the table often do not provide the international security guarantees required in the aftermath of violent conflict. Thus, while federalism had so far failed to convince the conflicting parties in other divided post-communist states, and the legacy of socialist-era federalism further limited the attractiveness of this type of conflict-management, the idea of secession was being employed for Kosovo.

Unlike Bieber, Coppieters argued that Kosovo's independence would have 'far-reaching', and not necessarily stabilizing consequences for other secessionist conflicts. This was widely recognized within the region. The Georgian president, for example, had asked Javier Solana to take the implications for Georgia into consideration when making a decision on Kosovo, fearful that it would act as a precedent. Coppieters reminded the audience that the principle at stake in Kosovo was not *sui generis*. The arguments being used to justify independence in Kosovo centre on 'just cause' (i.e. secession is the only way to rectify and prevent serious injustice). Yet the same arguments can be used in other 'frozen conflicts', especially in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where many Western countries prefer federal solutions. The precedent that an independent Kosovo might establish is that in

secessionist conflicts implying massive human rights violations and where 'just cause' arguments are at stake, only secession guarantees sovereignty and may also reasonably guarantee 'hard security', thus avoiding a repetition of injustice.

The 'just cause' approach is one of the two different logics informing secession: the other being the 'choice' approach. From a legal point of view, it is easier to build a case for secession by a 'just cause' argument where unilateral secession is legitimized on the free choice of the population. However, Coppieters reiterated that this argument did not apply only to Kosovo (the seceding territory). The 'choice' approach makes the status decision primarily dependent on a democratic decision, for example through a referendum, a scenario for which so far no provision had been made in Kosovo on the assumption that there would be overwhelming support. But this raises the question of the legitimate territorial unit for making such a decision. In cases of secessionism, such as Scotland, Quebec, or Flanders, a 'just cause' argument for secession taken by the secessionist movements themselves had gradually been transformed into an acceptance of the logic of 'choice'. These cases demonstrate the need and scope for the transformation of the language surrounding a conflict. The logic of the 'choice' approach is to create more realistic openings for democratic means of conflict-management, such as federalism, minority rights and economic justice. Coppieters pointed to one frozen conflict in the former Soviet Union – Transdnistria – where the language had shifted from 'just cause' to 'choice' and a referendum in September 2006 approved the right to 'nationhood' and to making a decision on independence. Secessionist movements using 'choice' arguments do not primarily argue that independence is the only way to correct or to prevent serious injustices, but that independence is the legitimate choice of a population. For secessionist movements using 'choice' arguments, such as in Scotland, Quebec, Flanders, but also Transdnistria, Kosovo can therefore not be used as precedent.

It is difficult to achieve acceptance for federal models in post-conflict countries based on 'just cause' arguments, due to the lack of federal experience in solving hard security problems in post-war settings. Sovereignty seems to offer far better security guarantees than non-sovereign federal institutions. International security organizations such as the UN, the OSCE or NATO, for instance, are only open to sovereign states. It may therefore be easier to find acceptance for federal solutions in secessionist conflicts where 'choice' argu-

ments are used and where populations do not feel threatened by the central government. Some secessionist movements have made a gradual shift from the use of 'just cause' to the use of 'choice' arguments. This is the case for Quebec and Flanders. But such a shift presupposes that there is no strong fear about a renewal of a violent conflict, political discrimination or other forms of severe injustices. In the case of Georgia, it is the responsibility of the government to create the conditions for such a shift in the attitude of the population of the secessionist entities. Once there is no fear of the use of force by the central government, the question of secession may be discussed on the basis of 'choice' rather than on 'just cause' arguments. This may give federalism a chance. This will need time, and a long process of confidence building.

The discussion following the initial remarks by the speakers covered a wide range of legal and political questions. It was recognized that a decision on Kosovo's independence that ignored Serbia's wishes would break with the international legal norm of consent in cases of secession. There was some debate as to whether such a decision would mark a shift in international legal norms towards the prioritization of 'universal' human rights concerns over 'territorial borders', thus overriding state sovereignty. Coppieters noted that massive abuses of human rights could delegitimize the right of a state to rule a particular territory. However, human rights issues and security are also salient in other 'frozen conflicts', yet secession is not proposed in these cases, suggesting that Western states do not have a coherent view of how to solve such conflicts.

Bieber suggested that implicit in the notion of consent was a visible commitment to resolving a conflict or accommodating diversity, and the international community was likely to argue that such a commitment was lacking in Serbia, as for example demonstrated by the exclusion of the Albanian electorate from the electoral list for the referendum on the constitution of Serbia. On

the other hand, the Albanians in Presevo had been encouraged to participate in the January 2007 parliamentary election in Serbia. He further stressed that a discussion about federal-type solutions was hypothetical at this stage. Apart from a decision on independence, the only other options in his view were the partition of Kosovo, an issue nobody was keen on re-opening, and the continuation of an ambiguous status, which might increase instability.

Bieber accepted that the steady out-migration of Serbs from Kosovo would continue after 'conditional' or full independence, resulting in an increasing homogenization of Kosovo. Both speakers agreed that too little attention had been paid by the international community to Kosovo's internal institutions and arrangements for securing minority rights, protections, and security issues. Any future international involvement in Kosovo would have to focus on these internal dynamics.

In conclusion, both speakers reflected upon the notion of the 'precedent'. The case of Chechnya's attempted secession was mentioned, but both speakers considered it unlikely to be affected by the decision on Kosovo. Much depends on what outcome is delivered by Ahtisaari. Bieber believed that no precedent was at stake and that Russia would follow Serbia's 'rhetorical resistance' and probably abstain in a Security Council vote, rather than use its veto. Coppieters considered it likely that Russia might use its veto in the Security Council against anything but a reworked version of the status quo, with continued UN administration being reformulated. In sum, the speakers disagreed as to whether a strongly worded proposal for 'conditional independence' would be taken by Russia as a precedent for other 'frozen conflicts'.

Reference:

Donald Horowitz (2003). "The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede". *Journal of Democracy* 14 (2) 5-17.

Kosovo's Security Sector Review

Lundrim Aliu

The years since the 1999 military and humanitarian intervention in Kosovo have seen a growing consensus in the international development community that security is both a basic human need and a

prerequisite for sustainable development. The prospective resolution of Kosovo's future status, in which significant security responsibilities could pass from international to local institutions, underscores the need for a review of security provision in Kosovo. Such a review¹ was performed for the first time in Kosovo in 2006 under UNDP auspices,² on the basis of a methodology recommended by the UK government's Security Sector Development Advisory Team.³ The Kosovo Internal Security Sec-

tor Review (ISSR) was conducted in eight stages, each of them influencing the final recommendations of the report. Stages 1 and 2 produced a threat analysis. In stages 3 and 4 a detailed institutional analysis of Kosovo's security-related institutions was carried out, as well as an extensive consultation and public outreach campaign. Stages 5 and 6 identified gaps in addressing threats to security. Stage 7 reviewed budget requirements and Stage 8 provided overall strategies to address the identified threats.

Input for the identification of perceived security threats came from several sources. Input was received from across Kosovo in town-hall meetings where over 800 people took part. Kosovars could give their input by telephone, email, or post. In addition, the ISSR research team completed more than 70 interviews with local and international officials. It also conducted an extensive document review that included international and local institutional reports and official documents. Institutional governance was analysed based on UNDP and World Bank methodology, while development was analysed based on OECD methodology. The EU 'Copenhagen Criteria' for accession served as the overall political benchmark.

The review focused also on issues such as private security companies, small arms and light weapons, gender, and freedom of movement. Much of the work was performed by a small ISSR team, comprised of international and local experts based in the prime minister's office. The team was supported by the Kosovo Institute for Research and Development, the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The review⁴ found that, while the security environment in Kosovo has improved significantly since the NATO intervention of 1999, it has also become more complicated. High unemployment and economic development issues (including infrastructure and access to electricity) are the main sources of insecurity for people in Kosovo, regardless of ethnicity. Issues of ethnic violence, corruption, and crime are often linked to these economic problems. The review emphasized the need to improve the education and health systems to promote economic growth, and found that the judiciary – widely perceived as inefficient, and not sufficiently

capable or independent – is a source of growing mistrust in institutions and political leaders. Externally, Kosovo faces such threats as trans-national organized crime and the possible renewal of political violence. The study concludes that Kosovo's relationship with its neighbours – Serbia in particular – is not stable, and requires further attention by the Government of Kosovo and the international community, which is administering and supervising Kosovo.

Although these findings are not directly related to Kosovo's status, they do have some important implications for its future. The report recommends the creation of new security institutions such as an executive Kosovo Security Council, a Ministry of Defence, a Kosovo Defence Force, and a Security Service – if Kosovo assumes responsibility for its own security institutions after the resolution of its status. It also recommends strong international involvement, mainly by NATO, in building these new security structures.

The review was a useful means of analysing institutional development needs in the security sector, and in calling attention to the depth and breadth of the human security challenges in Kosovo. Since internal state security structures have not yet developed in Kosovo beyond some policing and judiciary functions, the report's findings may help prevent security sector problems when these institutions are set up and running. Kosovo's security sector review can also serve as a template for reviews in other post-conflict locations, in particular in those where international institution or nation-building efforts will take place.

Until January Lundrim Aliu was Public Communications Consultant for the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR). Now he is National Political Affairs Officer for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

1. See ISSR, <http://www.issrkosovo.org>.

2. See UNDP, <http://www.kosovo.undp.org/?cid=2,3&argroup=6>.

3. See UK Ministry of Defence

<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/SecurityandIntelligence/SSDAT/>. The review was overseen by a committee on which the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo's provisional institutions of self-government were represented.

4. Cleland Welch, A.; Kondi, S.; Stinson, D.; Von Tangen Page M; (eds) 2006. *Internal Security Sector Review Kosovo*. Pristina: UNDP.

Enhancing Human Security through Civilian Oversight

Katrin Kinzelbach & Amrei Müller


The international community's traditional distinction between development and security has increasingly been challenged since the end of the Cold War. UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report encapsulates a discussion on the concept of security and highlights the linkages between human security, human development, and the promotion and protection of human rights. It argues that the traditional concept of security must change to become more people-centred.¹ Human security calls for security policies that protect people from a broad range of threats that prevent them from living freely and effectively exercising their choices.² Today, the United Nations and other international organizations increasingly promote security as a public good, provided by state authorities that are accountable to citizens. Fostering human security, therefore, requires that security sector agencies are not only placed under the direct control of democratically elected civilian governments, and subjected to oversight by parliaments and other civilian agencies such as independent *ombudsman* institutions, but also that their conduct is guided by principles such as the rule of law (including human rights law), transparency, equity, accountability, and participation.

At a 2004 High Level Meeting of the OECD's Development Advisory Committee, the development community endorsed a guidance note on security sector reform and suggested *inter alia* that security sector-related programming be integrated into existing development initiatives, no longer leaving security issues to military actors.³ In June 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared that security sector oversight was an important element for strengthening democracy in its member states, which include several countries from the former Soviet Union.⁴

The establishment of accountable and transparent security sector agencies remains challenging for many post-communist countries, where legacies of strong executive control and restrictions on political freedoms, including those implemented in the context of the 'war on terrorism', have led to high levels of public anxiety and mistrust of the state security apparatus. Polling data available on one of the security services, namely the police, are instructive in this respect. Data

from Western Europe shows that on average 30 percent of respondents do not trust the police.⁵ The levels of distrust in the police expressed in a recent poll conducted in countries in Eastern Europe and the CIS was notably higher. According to this study, the lowest levels of trust were found in Russia (65 percent) and Ukraine (75 percent).⁶ The data do not clearly indicate if people are fearful of the police or simply do not feel sufficiently protected by the police from threats such as organized crime. However, the data can be interpreted as a sign of weak civilian oversight – if an effective oversight mechanism were in place, it would help to guarantee that the police serve the interest and security needs of the taxpayers and thus improve levels of trust.

Percent of ombudsman caseloads involving complaints against security services



Parliaments, ombudsmen, and security sectors in Eastern Europe and the CIS

Despite calls for programming to integrate security and development, security assistance extended to countries from the former Soviet Union today still focuses primarily on military-to-military assistance. Even development actors that are actively engaged in human security issues still fail to effectively foster accountability mechanisms, especially those that extend beyond executive to legislative oversight and to other oversight mechanisms like *ombudsman* institutions.

Survey data collected from parliamentarians⁷ and *ombudsman* institutions⁸ by UNDP and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) during 2005-2006, and then discussed and validated in regional roundtable consultations, indicate a pronounced need for more development assistance for capacity development in the area of security sector

oversight in Eastern Europe and the CIS.⁹ Although in Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and, to some extent, in Armenia parliaments have taken steps towards creating the framework of laws and democratic institutions needed to implement democratic oversight, considerable obstacles to full scrutiny still exist in these countries. Azerbaijani parliamentarians did not identify discernible or meaningful parliamentary oversight of the security sector either in scrutiny of laws or policy. Outside of some limited parliamentary oversight of security-related questions in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, responses of Central Asian parliamentarians generally revealed that security sectors in Central Asia remain accountable almost solely to the executive.¹⁰ Given the general weakness of the legislature in these countries, the findings are hardly surprising. So while it is important to strengthen the legislature, it is equally important to identify alternative entry-points for security oversight.

Misconduct by security agencies frequently results in violations of human rights. *Ombudsman* institutions have a mandate to promote and protect human rights which endows them with critical responsibilities for civilian monitoring and investigation of the security sector. The UNDP/ DCAF data indicate that security services and their personnel account for significant shares of *ombudsman* institution caseloads¹² (see the chart below). It is important to note, however, that the data on complaints received by the *ombudsman* institution do not reflect the actual number of human rights violations committed in the respective countries, since they may be underreported for various reasons, and *ombudsman* institutions' capacity to deal with complaints may vary. What the data do confirm is, firstly, that security services in these countries can be a threat to human security; secondly, that citizens view national human rights institutions as a suitable mechanism to hold duty bearers responsible for their actions and to seek restoration and better protection of their rights.

The UNDP/ DCAF research also revealed that *ombudsman* institutions in Eastern Europe and the CIS frequently encounter difficulties while investigating claims of human rights abuses committed by security services. These difficulties are generally not jurisdictional in nature, since most *ombudsman* institutions have relatively broad formal mandates for security sector oversight. Problems instead take the form of inadequate cooperation by the security sector agencies themselves. In particular:

- Security sector personnel often possess inadequate knowledge and understanding of *ombudsman* insti-

tutions and relevant national and international legal conventions and norms.

- Security services are often reluctant to admit to committing human rights violations, and are unwilling to implement recommendations from the *ombudsman* institution. They typically only offer short, formal replies to *ombudsman* queries that do not adequately address the concerns articulated by complainants.
- *Ombudsman* institutions often face particular difficulties obtaining reliable and objective information concerning alleged violations of the human rights of members of the agency itself (e.g., the hazing of military conscripts).
- Although most *ombudsman* institutions have the right to enter security sector facilities freely, some services are reluctant to recognize that the ombudsperson him/herself can delegate this right to other staff members.
- Many security services have strong internal networks that protect the position and interests of security officials.¹³

Despite these difficulties, *ombudsman* institutions can make a difference. The Georgian Public Defender's Office, for example, established a system for the regular monitoring of police stations throughout the country, which it claims contributed to a considerable drop in incidents of torture in police stations and pre-trial cells since December 2004.¹⁴ At the same time, it is clear that the mandate of *ombudsman* institutions, which essentially allows for the issuance of reports, statements and recommendations but not binding decisions, limits their influence. While they can identify problems and recommend solutions, action is required by the executive, judiciary, and legislative. This also explains why public trust in a specific security sector agency can be low even where the *ombudsman* institution reports that a comparatively high percentage of its cases concern the security sector, such as for example in the case of Russia.

Towards more accountable and transparent security sector agencies

The findings presented here affirm that there remains a significant potential to strengthen security sector oversight in the region. The legacies of the Soviet security apparatus have created conditions that are far from ideal. Political resistance to the democratization of the security sector persist. At the same time, there are sever-

al political factors that support reform-minded groups, including the conditionality related to membership and association negotiations with the European Union as well as with NATO. To enhance human security in the former Soviet Union, however, it is imperative to look beyond the budgets, structures, and capacities of the security forces and to increase development assistance that strengthens the work of oversight bodies.

Katrin Kinzelbach is a Peace and Security Specialist/Project Manager at UNDP's Bratislava Regional Centre and Amrei Müller is a Carlo-Schmid trainee at the Regional Centre.

1. UNDP: *Human Development Report*, Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford, 1994, available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/>.
2. For more details on the concept of human security see: Commission on Human Security, Final Report: *Human Security Now*, 2003, available at: www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/.
3. In 2005, this policy guidance was formally published in book format. See OECD: *DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Security System Reform and Governance. Policy and Good Practice*, OECD Publications Service, Paris, 2005, particularly: pp. 46-48; available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf>.
4. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly: Doc. Nr. 10567, Strasbourg, 2005, available at: <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/EREC1713.htm>.
5. See Standard Eurobarometer 61 (May 2004): http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/eb61_en.pdf.

6. The countries covered included Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. See: Фонд "общественный вердикт" (Public Verdict Foundation): Приватизация полиции, 2006, available at: <http://www.publicverdict.org/ru/articles/research/ppl.html>.
7. The questionnaire was filled out by parliamentarians from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
8. *Ombudsman* institutions from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Uzbekistan filled out the questionnaire.
9. The term 'security sector' employed in the surveys includes all state services and agencies that have the legitimate authority to use force, to order the use of force, or to threaten the use of force.
10. For a more detailed summary of the results from the parliamentary questionnaire, please see: Cole, Eden, "The Status of Current Security Sector Governance in the CIS and its Relevance to Parliamentarians", in: Cole, Eden and Kinzelbach, Katrin (eds): *Democratising Security in Transition States*, UNDP/ DCAF, Bratislava, 2006, pp. 17-37, available at: http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_cms/show&content_id=FA6ED584-F203-1EE9-B801763FDED0CFF6.
11. Specifically, the following are covered by the questionnaire data: the police, pre-trial detention centers, correction facilities (including prisons), the border guard, military, and para-military forces.
12. 'Overall caseload' is defined as the number of cases acted upon by the *ombudsman* institution (including written complaints, oral requests, and other contacts).
13. For more on the results from the questionnaire addressed to *ombudsman* institutions, see Müller, Amrei, "Ombudsman Institutions and Security Sector Oversight: Results of a Questionnaire Survey from the former Soviet Union", in Cole, Eden and Kinzelbach, Katrin, *Monitoring and Investigating the Security Sector*, UNDP/ DCAF, Bratislava, 2007, pp. 16-35, available at: http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_cms/show&content_id=534782C7-F203-1EE9-B2425905D7F71BB9.
14. See the 2004 Annual Report of the Public Defender (*Ombudsman*) of Georgia, available at: <http://www.ombudsman.ge/download/annrep04E.pdf> as well as a 2006 report published by the same office: "Review of the Situation of Human Rights in Georgia and the Development of Human Rights Protection Institutions" (on file with UNDP Bratislava).

Transitional Justice in the Balkans

UNDP Transitional Justice Team

The legacy of gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law during the conflicts of 1991-1999 in the former Yugoslavia has had a lasting impact on the region. Cooperation has been difficult among the new states that emerged out of the former Yugoslavia. Only by democratizing and strengthening the rule of law will the region move forward towards sustainable peace and development. The democratic processes that commenced after 2000 in most of the countries of the region have bolstered their fragile institutions and enhanced their security and stability. At the same time, efforts have gathered pace to strengthen legal processes and bring the perpetrators of war crimes to justice.

Early transitional justice initiatives were mostly driven by international actors, for example as in the creation in 1993 by the UN of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an *ad hoc* court responsible for trying high-ranking perpetrators of war crimes. The ICTY process was essential for encouraging domestic prosecutions by local courts, thereby promoting

truth and responsibility in the region. Civil society organizations have also played a vital role in advocacy, education, and documentation.

However, transitional justice initiatives have lacked stronger governmental support, and political will has remained an obstacle to their implementation. Dealing with the past in the countries of the region remains a sensitive issue, and governments are reluctant to approach these problems. Unresolved issues remain throughout the region such as judicial reform, the continued impunity of war crimes perpetrators, the limited number of war crimes trials conducted, the lack of transparency on the part of governments, and the lack of civil



control of security forces. These problems are often coupled with lingering nationalist attitudes.

UNDP Serbia launched the Transitional Justice Programme (TJP) in January 2005 with the aim of increasing cooperation between governments, civil society organizations, and judiciaries in the former Yugoslavia. The TJP emphasizes regional mechanisms as the best and most efficient ones for dealing with transitional justice issues, and regional programming to achieve long-term peace and stability. The programme is run by the UNDP country offices in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo and Montenegro.

During the preparatory phase of the TJP, an *Assessment Survey (AS)* of transitional justice conditions in the region was published. Based on extensive research and interviews with local civil society organizations, government officials, and members of the judiciary, the report provides the first regional assessment of practices and conditions in transitional justice. The results and recommendations of the AS were presented at an international conference held in June 2006 in Belgrade, *"Building regional partnerships for transitional justice initiatives"*. Over 200 participants from the region, including members of the judiciary, government officials, civil society organizations and the media gathered to discuss transitional justice mechanisms and their feasibility at the local, national, and regional levels. Regardless of the sensitivity of the issues discussed, and the novelty of the regional approach in this field, the event resulted in a consensus on several topics and a number of partnership concepts were offered. In sum, participants stressed the importance of regional cooperation. Judicial representatives¹ offered a joint proposal that would establish a regional expert commission to examine the harmonization of penal policies in order to facilitate the transfer of cases from one national court to another. Participants also concluded that the governments in the region should assume a greater role in ensuring that war crimes trials are properly conducted, truth seeking

mechanisms are implemented, and reparations and institutional reforms are addressed.

In August 2006, encouraged by this broad support for national ownership of transitional justice, UNDP organized a series of learning workshops in Montenegro for over 100 parliamentarians and representatives of judiciaries from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia. The event was unique in that it was the first time that members of parliaments from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo and Serbia attended a training on transitional justice. MPs strongly supported the regional initiative, requested the continuation of such training programmes, and offered to host meetings to continue the inter-parliamentary dialogue on establishing national and regional transitional justice-related policies and mechanisms.

Thus far, the programme has had substantial success in organizing and implementing regional activities. This approach has been validated by a statistical survey of participants at the international conference in Belgrade in 2006. Seventy-five percent of them considered it essential to conduct regional transitional justice activities over national or local ones.

There are unresolved issues that could influence the transitional justice processes in the region, including the determination of Kosovo's final status and the pending verdict in the case before the ICTY for breach of the Genocide Convention. These issues could impede regional cooperation and must be carefully considered in future programming. In order to address these risks, the TJP has been developing complementary national and regional interventions to make sure that development gains are not lost.

This article was written by the Transitional Justice Programme Team from UNDP country offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia.

1. Ms. Meddzida Kreso, President of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mr. Sinisa Vazic, President of the War Crimes Chamber of Belgrade District Court offered this proposal.

EU Crisis Management in the Western Balkans

Stefan Wolff

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the countries of the former Yugoslavia have experienced a series of violent

conflicts leading to the break-up of a country that had been praised as a model for the management of ethnic diversity. On top of that, the self-determination claims that were at the heart of the conflicts in the 1990s continue to strain relations between ethnic groups within and beyond the region. Kosovo may be the most obvious case at the moment, but there are latent tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Southern Serbia, Sandjak, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, and it is unclear

what impact the resolution of Kosovo's final status will have on them.

Against this complex background the European Union, and its predecessor the European Community, sought to assert its emerging political and economic power in the management and resolution of the region's various overlapping conflicts. But despite attempts from the early 1990s onwards to broker a settlement that would have prevented the violence that ensued in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, much of the Union's engagement with the region during the last decade of the twentieth century was anything but a success. The policy of conditional recognition of new states was unable to influence actions on the ground, while various EU-sponsored and co-sponsored peace deals for Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as the Lisbon Plan (1992), the Vance-Owen Plan (1992-1993), and the 'principles for future constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina' (1993-1994), floundered. It was only after the Dayton Accords of 1995, and even more so after the NATO intervention over Kosovo in 1999 that the EU began to play an increasingly important and successful role as regional peace maker and mediator of conflicts in the Western Balkans. No matter which perspective one takes on the Union's crisis management policy, it remains the largest donor (with over €6 billion spent in the region since 1992) and the organisation with the biggest presence throughout this region. The stabilization thus achieved over the past years, partly in cooperation with third parties, is no least a result of the EU's ability and willingness to offer credible prospects of association and eventually membership to all countries of the region.

Current EU capabilities appear to be sufficient to take on tasks of the kind required in the Western Balkans—limited peace-keeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, and police support and training missions in these two countries. In addition, the EU has a significant military and police presence in the region and is a major player in the Kosovo final status negotiations under the auspices of the UN. The EU has been able to mobilize the personnel, hardware and funds needed to sustain these various missions. It has put in place the institutional framework and instruments required to make the necessary decisions and proved itself capable of cooperation and coordination within its own structures as well as with third parties. It is equally important in this context to bear in mind that since the failure of crisis management in the early and mid-1990s, the

Union's capabilities have improved significantly, enabling it now to undertake both civilian and military operations. In contrast to the early 1990s, the EU is now much better able to back up its diplomatic efforts with credible threats of force where necessary.

This relatively positive assessment of EU crisis management capabilities in the Western Balkans after 1999, however, must not be taken as a general indication of the readiness of the Union to manage crises elsewhere with similar degrees of success. While it is undoubtedly true that the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy has improved in its coherence, this does not necessarily translate into significant increases in effectiveness. In Macedonia, for example, it could be argued that early-stage crisis management, despite the mobilization of significant resources, failed, and that it was only after violent conflict had erupted that crisis management succeeded in brokering a deal—and even then only with the backing of NATO, precisely because the EU's military capabilities at that time were not yet operational and it had to rely on NATO for credible back-up. Likewise, the EU's more recent relative successes in the Western Balkans do not reflect only improved crisis management capabilities. The EU's policy conditionalities are much more effective *vis-à-vis* countries for which the promise of closer association with, and potentially accession to, the EU is credible, and where political elites and publics are ready to make compromises in order to facilitate accession.

In other words, the success of EU crisis management in the Western Balkans must be seen in a broader context, in which crisis management is only one element in a comprehensive approach to a region. Without a clear long-term commitment of the EU to the Western Balkans, the incentives for cooperation by political elites and the various ethnic groups they represent would be less powerful. Without this commitment the Union's ability to elicit short- and long-term compliance with its goals, which has been a major factor in the success of its crisis management operations so far, would be seriously diminished.

The commitments to build effective crisis management capabilities made by EU member states on paper have not yet been tested to the full. The two police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia are operating with only about 10 percent of the total number of police officers committed by EU member states, and the two military operations in these two countries similarly are operating with only

around 12 percent of the total troops promised. At the same time, the EU is now, for better or worse, locked into a framework of cooperation with NATO which will perpetuate its dependency on NATO resources. This may significantly reduce the Union's capabilities for autonomous action in situations where NATO resources are stretched, or where disagreement within NATO prevents the use of certain resources by the EU.

A final factor limiting the generalizability of the relative success of recent EU crisis management operations in the Western Balkans is at the same time one of the very reasons for the EU's success there—familiarity with, and sensitivity towards, the situation in the region and the countries concerned, long-standing networks of information sources, and previous experience in dealing with the political elites and populations in the area.

Nevertheless, even the limited crisis management operations that the EU is currently conducting in the Western Balkans are very valuable for the Union's future role as a serious international actor. While it might be too early to proclaim the overall success of EU conflict management in the region of the former Yugoslavia, there are some indicators suggesting that success might not elude the Union on this occasion. First of all, institutional reforms within the Union (such as the revisions to the Common European Security and Defence Policy by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the agreement, and gradual implementation of the Helsinki Headline Catalogue, the establishment of a rapid reaction funding mechanism, and institutionalized cooperation with NATO on sharing assets and information) have furthered the development of credible crisis management policies and instruments. Second, the EU's overall approach to the conduct of international affairs—combining multilateralism (both within and outside the EU), capacities for short-term crisis management with long-term structural conflict prevention, and appropriate balance between civilian and military strategies—has been shown to be effective. Third, by highlighting the remaining deficiencies in EU crisis management capabilities, the Union's experiences in the Western Balkans offer lessons for the future that should be considered before engaging in more ambitious and demanding operations elsewhere in the world.

Yet, there are also some important global lessons to be drawn from the EU's crisis management experience in the Western Balkans. First among them is the

necessary recognition that crisis management without credible military back-up is likely to fail in the face of adversaries on the ground determined to realize their maximum goals by military means. Second, and equally importantly, coercive diplomacy, and military intervention, alone are unable to offer long-term peace and stability. What is needed additionally is a strategy for post-conflict reconstruction and peace building that, while it may still rely on military enforcement mechanisms, also provides incentives to erstwhile adversaries to engage constructively with one another and with the international community. A third lesson extends to the need for multilateral cooperation. The resources, skills, and knowledge that the international community collectively brings to the table are invaluable for successful crisis management and conflict resolution. Influence on local actors, knowledge of particularities of specific conflicts, and intelligence on the intentions of various factions are as important as the military hardware and diplomatic personnel necessary to succeed in crisis management and conflict resolution.

The microcosm of the Western Balkans thus can be seen almost as a laboratory of crisis management and conflict resolution. The policies developed and employed here since the 1990s may not be directly transferable to other conflict-ridden regions such as the Caucasus, the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa or the Middle East, but they offer valuable lessons from failures and successes that the crisis managers of the future will ignore at their peril.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of Political Science at the University of Nottingham.



The European Union makes its presence felt in the Western Balkans (Photo: European Commission).



WTO Accession Regional Workshop. The event will take place on 1-2 April 2007 in Yverdon, Switzerland. UNDP's Bratislava Regional Centre is organizing this event together with other UN agencies such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International Trade Commission (ITC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This two-day workshop will provide an opportunity for trade policy makers and negotiators from the Commonwealth of Independent States to exchange views on lessons learned from the WTO accession process. Participants will discuss the challenges and opportunities of WTO accession from a human development perspective with specific case studies, and to explore potential for cooperation with the WTO on accession issues. For further information please contact Gina Volynsky, Trade and Economic Development Policy Advisor (gina.volynsky@undp.org), or Juneyoung Lee, Trade Policy Consultant (juneyoung.lee@undp.org).

Association for the Study of Nationalities 2007 Annual Convention, sponsored by the Harriman Institute, will be held at Columbia University, New York, 12-14 April 2007. The preliminary programme can now be downloaded at http://www.nationalities.org/ASN_2007_prelim_program.pdf. There will be 110 panels, and more than 340 papers on the Balkans, Central Europe, Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Turkey, China, and Nationalism Studies. Those interested in attending the convention are invited to register in advance by accessing a registration form at http://www.nationalities.org/ASN_2007_prereg_form.pdf and sending it to Convention Assistant Director Tennie Olney by attachment (mlo2109@columbia.edu) or by postal mail to the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 420 W 118th St., New York, NY 10027, United States (tel. 212 854 8487). Only registration with payment will be accepted.

The **London School of Economics (LSE)**, together with **UNDP**, is hosting a **Roundtable** at LSE to discuss the questions raised in this issue of the newsletter on conflict and development. Participants will include LSE scholars, senior UNDP representatives, as well as a keynote speaker. The

event will take place on 1 May 2007. For more information please contact Denisa Papayova (denisa.papayova@undp.org).

The LSE Schapiro Lecture Series presents: **"Watchdogs of War: the Media and NGOs in Russia – in memory of Anna Politkovskaya"**. This event, chaired by Prof. Margot Light, will feature Vaughan Smith, Jonathan Steele, and Thomas de Waal as speakers. Margot Light is professor emeritus of International Relations at LSE. Vaughan Smith is director of Frontline. Jonathan Steele is a columnist for The Guardian and roving foreign correspondent. Thomas de Waal is project coordinator and editor at the Institute for War and Peace reporting. This roundtable will discuss the media coverage of the war in Chechnya and the role of NGOs in Russia. The event will take place on 2 May 2007, 6.30 p.m., Hong Kong Theatre, LSE Clement House, Ground Floor. The roundtable is free and open to all with no ticket required. For enquiries please visit www.lse.ac.uk/events or email events@lse.ac.uk.

UNDP's initiative in Cyprus, *Action for Cooperation and Trust*, is hosting the first International Civil Society Fair, **"Open Voices-Active Citizens"**, which will be held in Nicosia, Cyprus from 3 – 5 May 2007. The aim of this event is to raise the levels of active participation in Cypriot Civil Society through the strengthening and formation of local and international partnerships and networks around the themes of **Corporate Social Responsibility, Resource Mobilization, Networking and Volunteerism**. The fair will consist of three inter-related elements including an exhibition area, workshops/presentations and panel discussions, and an entertainment programme. For further information please contact Nilgun Arif (nilgun.arif@undp.org) or Marina Vasilara (marina.vasilara@undp.org). Tel: +357 22 874 777. www.undp-act.org.

Forthcoming issues of *Development and Transition* will focus on:


'The post-communist private sector and poverty reduction' (July 2007)

'Gender issues in the region' (November 2007)

The editors welcome contributions. If you wish to submit an article please follow the guidelines at www.developmentandtransition.net.

Development & Transition is published by the United Nations Development Programme and the London School of Economics and Political Science

www.developmentandtransition.net



UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre

Grosslingova 35
Bratislava 81109
Slovakia

Tel: +421 2 59337 111
Fax: +421 2 59337 450
www.undp.org/europeandcis

Editor: James Hughes: j.hughes@lse.ac.uk **Executive Editor:** Ben Slay **Deputy Editor:** Gwendolyn Sasse **Managing Editor:** Peter Serenyi **Marketing and Production Coordinator:** Denisa Papayova **Advisory Board:** Nicholas Barr, Willem Buiter (Chair), Stanislav Gomulka, Mary Kaldor, Dominic Lieven, Margot Light, Kate Mortimer



THE LONDON SCHOOL
OF ECONOMICS AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE ■

Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
www.lse.ac.uk