The global economic crisis has produced many predictions of mass mobilization in both Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. Yet,  sustained mass mobilization has not materialized. Simply put, there are other political opportunity issues at stake when predicting mass-mobilization. Previous studies of transition and post-transition periods in the two regions have focused on the persistence of protest in the former and the perseverance of patience in the latter.  Yet, over time, it has become obvious that the motivations and patterns of mobilization in both regions have converged. When crises are understood to be propelled by political mismanagement, sporadic mass-protests occur in Latin America. Such protests have been replicated more recently in Central and Eastern Europe. Although there is an absence of sustained mass-protest, we have seen the emergence of localized grassroots engagement in both regions, especially during the recent economic crisis. A comparison of the recent crisis-related protests in Latvia, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, with similar episodes in Mexico, Chile, and Argentina, shows that although economic crises can facilitate or trigger social mobilization ultimately it is socio-political factors (referred to as political opportunity structures) that are the most important determinants.

Even a severe economic downturn in a country with average levels of trust, government support, and no internal political crises will not automatically trigger mass-mobilization of ‘ordinary people’. However, severe economic downturns can compound existing crises and thus, the deeper the crisis on both political and socio-economic terms, the higher the probability that mobilization will go beyond activists and opposition and acquire a mass character.

Several Central and Eastern Europe countries share characteristics associated with a perceived vulnerability to mass-mobilization, such as newer/less stable political institutions, high instances of political conflict, recent histories of mass-mobilization (excepting Russia and Belarus), and higher rates of distrust in individual politicians and political institutions. Thus, in the face of economic hardship, it is assumed that Central and Eastern European countries would be ideal candidates for mass-mobilization. But, as in Latin America, only particular countries, such as Latvia, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine–where the economic crisis has exacerbated ongoing socio-political crises and general anti-elite sentiment–appear vulnerable.

Latvia has seen several protests in late 2008 and early 2009. On 13 January 2009, peaceful protests turned into riots. The protesters called for the government to resign, as it was perceived to have mismanaged the economic crisis. The initial protesters were students and youth, and even at their peak only a small share of the general population joined in the protests. Perceptions of political mismanagement and arrogance, rather than the economic crisis per se, have been the main issue for the protestors. The protests forced the government to resign. Although the immediate outcome of the protests seems to punish the political elite in power, in the longer term the new government’s policies are not likely to stray far from its predecessors and the effects of the economic mismanagement are likely to persist. Interestingly the government’s resignation appeased protesters and pre-empted the spread of protests, muting their severity and making further mass protests unlikely.

Moldova witnessed the eruption of violent protests following the recent parliamentary elections in which the Moldovan Communist Party triumphed decisively. © Tomas van Houtryve/Panos Pictures

Moldova, which has also been hit badly by the economic crisis and gas shortages, witnessed the eruption of violent protests against the government following the recent parliamentary elections in which the Moldovan Communist Party triumphed. The protests turned violent after outgoing President Vladimir Voronin stated that, although he intends to step down in accordance with the constitution’s term limit, he will remain the key political player akin to, as he put it,  a ‘Moldovan Deng Xiaoping’. These were not mass-protests. The protesters were mostly young activists and students not previously connected to opposition groups, who organized themselves using twitter and other social-networking sites. The fact that Moldova’s economic crisis coincides with an election year has exacerbated the political crisis in the country. It was the perception of increased political elitism and the centralization of power that was challenged by the protestors, not the social consequences of the economic crisis.  The government reacted with a severe and violent crackdown, leading to injury and imprisonment of activists. For social mobilization theorists this would be a signal that political opportunity structures are weak in Moldova and thus sustained mass-mobilization is unlikely. By boycotting the election of a new president in parliament, the opposition parties have forced new parliamentary elections. If they remain aloof from the protests, it is possible that they too will become victims of the growing anti-elite sentiment.

Since its 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’, Georgia has witnessed two episodes of mass mobilization; most recently, protests were organized on 9 April 2009 by opposition parties hoping to topple President Mihail Saakashvili. In contrast to previous mobilizations, Saakashvili now faces lower approval ratings following the war with Russia and his previous use of force against the opposition. The protests to date have not been of a mass character and, unlike in Moldova, all protestors are supporters of, and organized by, the opposition. Georgia is a case where socio-political crises have already destabilized the government; and with the onset of a recession Saakashvili’s leadership is being seriously challenged. For protests to take on a mass character two things would have to occur: (a) the opposition would have to divide the ruling elite by finding political allies within Saakashvili’s inner circle; and (b) opposition movements would have to find a way to reach out to ‘ordinary’ Georgians who have been affected by the various crises and who have until now maintained support for the government despite their growing frustration about the military and political weakness of the current regime.

Ukraine’s severe economic crisis is being intensified by political crisis in the run-up to the presidential elections. Ukraine could have been the example par excellence of crisis mobilization, but while local protests have been reported by the media, no mass-mobilization has yet taken hold. There is a lack of coordination as most independent protests are not linked to the youth networks that emerged during the ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004-2005. There have been several instances of sporadic protests, e.g. recently laid-off workers ‘taking over’ small factories and running them in the style of ‘cooperative/recovered factories’, as has occurred in post-2001 Argentina. In early March, more than 200 truck drivers threatened to block roads if the government did not pay their debts. These are new repertoires in Ukraine and point to the increased political agency of a portion of the population previously excluded from collective action. While the opposition has attempted to exploit the sustained economic and political crisis to mobilize ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians, their success has been mixed. On 3 April 2009, some 15,000 protesters gathered on Independence Square under opposition party flags and banners. Opposition leader Viktor Yanukovich continued to demand the resignation of the government of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and President Viktor Yushchenko, blaming the severity of the economic crisis on their political conflict. Yet it is Yanukovich’s territory–Ukraine’s eastern industrial belt–where the crisis has hit the hardest, and where small instances of local protest have also been observed. It is therefore no surprise that recent protesters have used slogans akin to those used in Argentina in 2001–‘get rid of them all’. In post-‘Orange Revolution’ Ukraine the repertoire of public protest in main city squares has been co-opted by all the main party blocs as campaign ‘technology’. Ukrainians are very well aware that these events are bought and paid for and that they are not rooted in authentic activism or popular agency, but are controlled by the political elite. This ‘knowledge’ may in fact delegitimize mass protest.

The most interesting and ‘new’ instances of protests in Ukraine, and more broadly in the Central and Eastern European region, are those that are local and organized not by rank- and-file activists as in 2001 and 2004, but by ‘ordinary people’. Dissatisfaction with politics in general is on the rise; and in a climate of uncertainty over regular presidential and early parliamentary elections, the question is whether protests will take on a grassroots/local or mass/national character; and whether certain political groupings, including existing activist networks, prove more successful than others in capitalizing on this dissatisfaction.

In contrast to Central and Eastern Europe, protest is always expected in Latin America, where economic and political crises seem to occur in tandem. Low levels of trust in politicians and political institutions, weak governments with high levels of political factionalism and falling approval ratings, strong activist networks with previous mass-mobilization experience, are considered opportunity structures that make mass-mobilization more likely. Economic crisis management policies and budget cuts have sparked recent protests in Latin America, most notably in Mexico, Chile, and Argentina.  Much like the above cases in the Central and Eastern European region, these have been mainly sporadic protests by activists or experienced protesters.

The experience of Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe suggests that while socio-economic crises can trigger and facilitate social mobilization, it is only when they coincide with serious political instability and uncertainty that we see major protests. Socio-economic crises seem to lead to localized and grassroots mobilization while the larger, more systemic political conflicts have taken on a mass character. It is thus important to differentiate between the different triggers of protest, and understand local thresholds of collective patience and protest. While thresholds are country-and era-specific, we know that they are associated with levels of political trust and support for individual politicians and political institutions. This underscores the importance of analyzing recent declines in public trust in politicians and institutions in Latvia, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Furthermore, previous episodes of mass mobilization suggest that thresholds of tolerance are most often breached when perceived rights and freedoms (for example, employment) are seen as under threat and ‘ordinary people’ who were not previously engaged in protests join in. The effects of the crisis management tactics adopted by the political elite on local thresholds of patience and protest are also important in this respect. All governments–particularly those attempting to manage economic crisis during an election year or time of heightened political competition–should understand the need to engage in a three-way dialogue with opposition parties, activist groups, and ordinary citizens, in order to better understand local patience and protest thresholds.

Olga Onuch is a Doctoral Candidate at Nuffield College,  University of Oxford.