Enhancing Human Security through Civilian Oversight

The international community’s traditional distinction between development and security has increasingly been challenged since the end of the Cold War. UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report encapsulates a discussion on the concept of security and highlights the linkages between human security, human development, and the promotion and protection of human rights. It argues that the traditional concept of security must change to become more people-centred.¹ Human security calls for security policies that protect people from a broad range of threats that prevent them from living freely and effectively exercising their choices.² Today, the United Nations and other international organizations increasingly promote security as a public good, provided by state authorities that are accountable to citizens. Fostering human security, therefore, requires that security sector agencies are not only placed under the direct control of democratically elected civilian governments, and subjected to oversight by parliaments and other civilian agencies such as independent ombudsman institutions, but also that their conduct is guided by principles such as the rule of law (including human rights law), transparency, equity, accountability, and participation. 

At a 2004 High Level Meeting of the OECD’s Development Advisory Committee, the development community endorsed a guidance note on security sector reform and suggested inter alia that security sector-related programming be integrated into existing development initiatives, no longer leaving security issues to military actors.³ In June 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared that security sector oversight was an important element for strengthening democracy in its member states, which include several countries from the former Soviet Union.⁴

The establishment of accountable and transparent security sector agencies remains challenging for many post-communist countries, where legacies of strong executive control and restrictions on political freedoms, including those implemented in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’, have led to high levels of public anxiety and mistrust of the state security apparatus. Polling data available on one of the security services, namely the police, are instructive in this respect. Data from Western Europe shows that on average 30 percent of respondents do not trust the police.⁵ The levels of distrust in the police expressed in a recent poll conducted in countries in Eastern Europe and the CIS was notably higher. According to this study, the lowest levels of trust were found in Russia (65 percent) and Ukraine (75 percent).⁶ The data do not clearly indicate if people are fearful of the police or simply do not feel sufficiently protected by the police from threats such as organized crime. However, the data can be interpreted as a sign of weak civilian oversight – if an effective oversight mechanism were in place, it would help to guarantee that the police serve the interest and security needs of the taxpayers and thus improve levels of trust.

Parliaments, ombudsmen, and security sectors in Eastern Europe and the CIS
Despite calls for programming to integrate security and development, security assistance extended to countries from the former Soviet Union today still focuses primarily on military-to-military assistance. Even development actors that are actively engaged in human security issues still fail to effectively foster accountability mechanisms, especially those that extend beyond executive to legislative oversight and to other oversight mechanisms like ombudsman institutions.

Survey data collected from parliamentarians⁷ and ombudsman institutions⁸ by UNDP and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) during 2005-2006, and then discussed and validated in regional roundtable consultations, indicate a pronounced need for more development assistance for capacity development in the area of security sector oversight in Eastern Europe and the CIS.⁹ Although in Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and, to some extent, in Armenia parliaments have taken steps towards creating the framework of laws and democratic institutions needed to implement democratic oversight, considerable obstacles to full scrutiny still exist in these countries. Azerbaijani parliamentarians did not identify discernible or meaningful parliamentary oversight of the security sector either in scrutiny of laws or policy. Outside of some limited parliamentary oversight of security-related questions in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, responses of Central Asian parliamentarians generally revealed that security sectors in Central Asia remain accountable almost solely to the executive.¹⁰ Given the general weakness of the legislature in these countries, the findings are hardly surprising. So while it is important to strengthen the legislature, it is equally important to identify alternative entry-points for security oversight.

Misconduct by security agencies frequently results in violations of human rights. Ombudsman institutions have a mandate to promote and protect human rights which endows them with critical responsibilities for civilian monitoring and investigation of the security sector. The UNDP/ DCAF data indicate that security services¹¹ and their personnel account for significant shares of ombudsman institution caseloads¹² (see the chart below). It is important to note, however, that the data on complaints received by the ombudsman institution do not reflect the actual number of human rights violations committed in the respective countries, since they may be underreported for various reasons, and ombudsman institutions’ capacity to deal with complaints may vary. What the data do confirm is, firstly, that security services in these countries can be a threat to human security; secondly, that citizens view national human rights institutions as a suitable mechanism to hold duty bearers responsible for their actions and to seek restoration and better protection of their rights.   

The UNDP/ DCAF research also revealed that ombudsman institutions in Eastern Europe and the CIS frequently encounter difficulties while investigating claims of human rights abuses committed by security services. These difficulties are generally not jurisdictional in nature, since most ombudsman institutions have relatively broad formal mandates for security sector oversight. Problems instead take the form of inadequate cooperation by the security sector agencies themselves. In particular:

• Security sector personnel often possess inadequate knowledge and understanding of ombudsman institutions and relevant national and international legal conventions and norms.

• Security services are often reluctant to admit to committing human rights violations, and are unwilling to implement recommendations from the ombudsman institution. They typically only offer short, formal replies to ombudsman queries that do not adequately address the concerns articulated by complainants.

• Ombudsman institutions often face particular difficulties obtaining reliable and objective information concerning alleged violations of the human rights of members of the agency itself (e.g., the hazing of military conscripts).

• Although most ombudsman institutions have the right to enter security sector facilities freely, some services are reluctant to recognize that the ombudsperson him/herself can delegate this right to other staff members.

• Many security services have strong internal networks that protect the position and interests of security officials.¹³

Despite these difficulties, ombudsman institutions can make a difference. The Georgian Public Defender’s Office, for example, established a system for the regular monitoring of police stations throughout the country, which it claims contributed to a considerable drop in incidents of torture in police stations and pre-trial cells since December 2004.¹⁴ At the same time, it is clear that the mandate of ombudsman institutions, which essentially allows for the issuance of reports, statements and recommendations but not binding decisions, limits their influence. While they can identify problems and recommend solutions, action is required by the executive, judiciary, and legislative. This also explains why public trust in a specific security sector agency can be low even where the ombudsman institution reports that a comparatively high percentage of its cases concern the security sector, such as for example in the case of Russia.

Towards more accountable and transparent security sector agencies
The findings presented here affirm that there remains a significant potential to strengthen security sector oversight in the region. The legacies of the Soviet security apparatus have created conditions that are far from ideal. Political resistance to the democratization of the security sector persist. At the same time, there are several political factors that support reform-minded groups, including the conditionality related to membership and association negotiations with the European Union as well as with NATO. To enhance human security in the former Soviet Union, however, it is imperative to look beyond the budgets, structures, and capacities of the security forces and to increase development assistance that strengthens the work of oversight bodies.

Katrin Kinzelbach is a Peace and Security Specialist/Project Manager at UNDP’s Bratislava Regional Centre and Amrei Müller is a Carlo-Schmid trainee at the Regional Centre.