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Stopping Global Warming

One of the best ways to save the planet and stop global warming is to make our living area and or home as eco-friendly as possible. Here at development and transition we have talked a lot about solar power, solar water heaters and how you can save money by not using electricity from the grid. But another way that you can save money and use a lot less electricity is by making your house airtight and getting it properly insulated. There’s a new product that many people do not know about, and it is called spray foam insulation, it has been widely used in the United States and is growing in popularity.

Spray Foam Insulation Los Angeles

We found the top spray foam insulation contractor in Austin and ask them to give us some information on spray foam insulation the benefits and the drawbacks. The company is called synergy spray foam insulation, and they are a national franchise that has been helping homeowners since 1998. The owner Michael Rodriguez says,” we have seen the insulation business changed so much in the past 15 years it is almost unrecognizable. The amount of money homeowners can save by using foam insulation compared to your typical fiberglass insulation is amazing. Some of our homeowners in the Austin area have reported back to us that they have saved up to 40% on their electric bill”.

Mr. Rodriguez went on to say that spray foam insulation may not be the cheapest option at first, but you make back investment in less than four years by the money you will save on your energy bills. Also, you’re helping save the planet by making your house more eco-friendly, by using less electricity that is fewer fossil fuels that have to be burned. If just 10% of people throughout Europe and United States chose to install solar panels and combine that with spray foam insulation the amount of energy needed to be created would be reduced by a significant amount.

When we think about what this planet is going to look like not five years but a hundred years or 200 years and what we are leaving for our children and our grandchildren than our choice is obvious. We don’t exactly know what the future is going to hold but, we do know that if we do not make changes in the way we live and the way we view our planet and the resources that are on it our children and our grandchildren we’ll not have a life like we have.

So in conclusion it is up to every one of us to live our lives with sustainability in mind, and that includes the choices of food that we eat, The products that we buy and how we live our lives

Climate Change in Central Asia

The desiccation of the Aral sea is a vivid example of how water, energy and sustainable development are all connected to climate change in Central Asia. © Mark Pitcher/Flickr

The desiccation of the Aral sea is a vivid example of how water, energy and sustainable development are all connected to climate change in Central Asia. © Mark Pitcher/Flickr

Since all the Central Asian countries rely heavily on irrigated agriculture, climate change is closely linked to water availability, energy security, and sustainable development in the region. The desiccation of the Aral Sea as a result of irrigated agriculture in Central Asia’s downstream countries, and the socio-economic and health problems that have resulted in communities close to the Aral Sea–problems that are likely to get worse if climate change further increases temperatures and aridity in the region–illustrate these linkages in sharp detail.

Overview

All five countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) have begun to establish the legal and regulatory frameworks needed for meeting their commitments under the UN Framework for Combating Climate Change (UNFCCC). As most are non-Annex I countries under the UNFCCC, their commitments are limited to measuring their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as well as conducting vulnerability and mitigation studies. Fortunately, the Kyoto Protocol has opened up carbon finance and other development opportunities for these countries, via their potential participation in GHG mitigation projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM). However, despite progress by Uzbekistan in this area, no Central Asian country has yet succeeded in registering a project with the CDM Executive Board.

Climate change and water in Central Asia

Due to population growth, aridity, the importance of irrigation for the cultivation of water-intensive crops like cotton and rice, and the shared nature of the region’s water resources, water is at the heart of Central Asia’s development challenges. In addition to a Soviet legacy of desiccation of the Aral Sea by the unsustainable diversion of Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya river waters in support of Central Asia’s cotton monoculture, serious problems of flooding, salinity, and water logging reduce agricultural productivity across the region. Water quality in Central Asia has drastically deteriorated since the 1960s, due to large discharges of polluted water through drainage systems into the Aral Sea basin.2

Climate change is expected to exacerbate further water scarcity in the region and the problems of the Aral Sea. Rising temperatures are already melting 46 of Central Asia’s glaciers (see Figure 1). The Pamir-Alai glaciers lost 19 percent of their mass during the second half of the 20th century; glacier coverage in various parts of the Tien Shan, Gissaro-Alai, Pamir, Dzhungarskiy, and Zailiyskiy Alatau mountains is currently shrinking at the average rate of about 1 percent annually. This melt will ultimately reduce water flow in the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers by up to 40 and 30 percent, respectively. Incre?asing frequency of droughts and reduced agricultural productivity are also widely predicted (UNDP 2005).

Figure 1—Projected degradation of glaciers by 2050

Source: Tajikistan 2002: State of the Environment Report (www.caresd.net/site.html? en=0*id=13).

Carbon profiles in Central Asia

As the data in Figures 2 and 3 below show, the Central Asian countries have quite different carbon profiles. Although all five countries inherited energy-inefficient industrial structures from the Soviet period, annual GHG emissions produced by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan declined sharply in the 1990s, due to large declines in industrial production and economic restructuring. However, they increased in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan–and in Turkmenistan, this increase exceeded the global average. Thanks to rapid growth in its coal, oil, and gas industries, and its reliance on coal-fired power plants, Kazakhstan has become one of the world’s three dozen largest GHG emitters; per-capita GHG emissions in Kazakhstan, as well as in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, are now well above global averages. By contrast, because GDP and industrial output have not yet returned to pre-1990 levels, and since hydroelectricity plays a large role in their energy balances, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan continue to report per-capita CO2 emissions that are below global averages.

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan could benefit extensively from carbon financed ‘green investments’ funded by developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol’s clean development mechanism. Within the region, Uzbekistan has made the most progress in developing an enabling environment for carbon finance. However, all five countries could benefit significantly from energy efficiency measures, in order to reduce energy intensities that remain well above the levels reported in China, not to mention in the OECD countries. For Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in particular, where residents in many mountain communities do not have access to electricity, improving the business and investment climates, in order to attract foreign and domestic capital into electricity production, generation, and distribution–including small-scale investments in renewable energy technologies–is key to reducing poverty and improving living standards.

Figure 2—Changes in annual GHG emissions in Central Asia (1990-2004)

Source: UNDP Human Development Report Office

Climate change adaptation in Central Asia

Kazakhstan is among the world’s three dozen largest GHG emitters, and emissions per dollar of GDP produced in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s highest. Still, none of the Central Asian countries can rely solely on national mitigation efforts to reduce the threats posed by climate change. Measures to adapt to these threats must therefore lie at the heart of Central Asia’s response. Important adaptation measures include:
• in-depth research on climate change, its impacts on natural resources, economic activity, and public health, leading to the design and implementation of appropriate adaptation measures;
• improvements in environmental monitoring and measuring systems to better track changes in temperature, precipitation, water flow, and glacier melt;
• development of analytical and institutional capacities to use the data produced by these systems for better meteorological forecasting, climate modelling, and early warning purposes, as well as for environmental impact and health assessments, land-use planning, and better water infrastructure management.

Figure 3—Per-capita CO2 emissions in Central Asia (tons)

Source: UNDP Human Development Report Office

Linkages between climate change and water issues in Central Asia underscore the importance of water management in national adaptation strategies. Improvements in the efficiency of irrigation systems (per-capita water consumption rates in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s highest) could produce large savings in water use, thereby reducing the worst of the climate change risks. Specific measures here include:
• lining irrigation canals to reduce seepage losses (up to 40 percent of diverted water is lost from these canals);
• reducing the use of irrigation by inefficient flooding methods, which produces significant unintentional flooding, water logging, and salinization in surrounding areas;
• increasing the cultivation of more highly valued and less water-intensive fruit and vegetable crops, at the expense of cotton and other less sustainable agricultural activities; and
• expanding the use of more modern, efficient drip and below-ground irrigation systems.

Should melting glaciers reduce water flow in the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya rivers and damage hydroelectricity prospects for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the accelerated adoption of energy efficiency measures in these countries could be essential to preventing sharp reductions in electricity production. If such measures are not undertaken, the collapse of Tajikistan’s electrical energy infrastructure during the winter of 2007-2008 could be a harbinger of the future.

Conclusions

Melting glaciers, the desiccation of the Aral Sea, and the collapse of Tajikistan’s electricity infrastructure during the harsh winter of 2007-2008, show the close links between climate change, water, energy security, and development in Central Asia. A potential violent conflict over scarce water resources in the region has long been mooted by experts. The accelerated adoption of measures to reduce the wasteful use of water and energy, and encourage more sustainable forms of agricultural development, is central to the region’s stability and development prospects. So are measures to improve the business and investment climates for investment–domestic and foreign–to modernize electrical energy sectors, including especially investments in renewable energy technologies. Prospects for investments funded in part by carbon finance under the Kyoto Protocol’s clean development mechanism are also linked to improvements in business and investment climates in Central Asia.

As market liberalization and higher prices for electricity and water service delivery (particularly for irrigated agriculture) must inevitably play a role in these reforms, these measures need to be accompanied by efforts to better target social assistance, to provide greater protection for those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The national development and poverty reduction strategies now being designed and implemented in Central Asia–often with the support of the international community–should ideally reflect the linkages between climate change and poverty alleviation.

Renat Perelet is Research Leader in the Institute for Systems Analysis, Russian Academy of Sciences.

References:

1 This article is based on a background paper commissioned by UNDP for the 2007/2008 Human Development Report, Fighting Climate Change: Human solidarity in a divided world. (http://hdr.undp.org).
2 See Central Asia Human Development Report: Bringing Down Barriers, UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre, 2005 (http://europeandcis.undp.org/intra/show/300BDC00-F203-1EE9-BE944F24EDFC09CE).

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Prospects for Renewable Energy in Kyrgyzstan

Edil Bogombayev and Ularbek Mateyev

The Naryn river, flowing through both Uzbekistani and Kyrgyzstani regions, contains many reservoirs which are vital components of Kyrgyzstan’s hydroelectricity production. © Simon Taylor/Flickr

The Naryn river, flowing through both Uzbekistani and Kyrgyzstani regions, contains many reservoirs which are vital components of Kyrgyzstan’s hydroelectricity production. © Simon Taylor/Flickr

Many residents of Kyrgyzstan’s mountain communities live below the poverty line. As they are not reliably connected to the national electricity grid, mountain communities must rely on firewood and other local fuel sources for heat and cooking. In addition to reflecting material hardship, reliance on wood fuels exacerbates problems of deforestation and land degradation, as well as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The expansion of renewable energy technologies like solar power, biomass, and small hydro could both reduce poverty and improve Kyrgyzstan’s carbon profile. According to the State Centre for Renewable Energy, the potential for renewables in Kyrgyzstan amounts to some 840 million tons of fuel equivalent–only 0.2 percent of which is utilized at present.

Mitigating climate change while reducing poverty

The National Energy Programme of Kyrgyzstan (through 2010) and the Strategy for the Fuel and Energy Complex Development (through 2025) therefore call for the rapid expansion of renewables, inter alia by building some 100 small hydro power plants with total capacity of 178 megawatts and average annual output up to 1 billion kilowatt hours (kWh). This would increase the share of renewables in Kyrgyzstan’s energy balance by some seven percentage points, while annual GHG emissions would drop by 900,000 tons of CO2 equivalent. Greater use of renewables could also improve living standards in Kyrgyzstan’s poorer communities.

Biogas: Clean energy and higher farm yields

Farming and animal husbandry–which generate significant amounts of organic waste–are important sources of income in Kyrgyzstan’s mountain communities. Preliminary results obtained in biogas technology tests suggest a real breakthrough is in the offing, both in terms of raising crop yields (via creating new sources of organic fertilizer1) and increasing natural gas supplies (primarily for heating and cooking, but also for producing electricity via gas-powered generators) in rural communities.

Experts estimate that biogas plants could produce some 5 million tons of fertilizer and some 200 million cubic metres of gas in Kyrgyzstan annually. Biogas facilities in Kyrgyzstan currently produce 2 million cubic metres of biogas annually, for residential and commercial uses. They also produce 70,000 tons of fertilizer annually–enough to cover some 20,000 hectares of farm and pasture land. In order to repair the damage caused by land degradation in Kyrgyzstan, some 300,000 tons of fertilizers would need to be applied annually. Biogas could be an important part of the answer: the investment costs of a biogas plant are typically recouped within the first 18 months of its exploitation.

A simplified diagram of a biogas digester

Solar power prospects

Kyrgyzstan is rich in solar energy potential: some 250 sunny days are recorded annually; and the average annual output of solar energy is about 2,500 kWh per square metre. Thanks to a dynamic solar NGO movement (supported in part by the Global Environmental Facility’s Small Grants Programme), small-scale solar technologies are spreading rapidly in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the areas around popular tourist attractions at Lake Issyk-Kul. Purchases of solar collectors for hot water heating (which cost around $150) and solar water tanks ($60) are increasingly common, despite their relatively high costs – so is the construction of residential and commercial structures that rely on passive solar heating systems.

The economics of small-scale solar power in Kyrgyzstan’s mountain communities are also attractive, although not as attractive as biogas. The recoupment period for residential solar power facilities has now fallen to 4-5 years in the Issyk-Kul and Chui regions (where the capital, Bishkek, is located). Higher electricity and heating tariffs are expected to reduce this further–as could increased carbon finance flows under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism. Growing demand for solar power systems has also created new  opportunities for local businesses, by triggering the local production of components, including metal tanks, aluminium lining, and hollow plastic materials.

Small-scale hydro power

Hydroelectricity dominates Kyrgyzstan’s energy balance, providing some two thirds of the country’s electricity. However, the power sector is dominated by large-scale hydroelectricity infrastructure, symbolized by the Naryn cascade of power stations that catch the waters released from the Toktogul dam. By contrast, much of Kyrgyzstan’s small scale hydro potential remains unexploited. Prospects for tapping this potential in Kyrgyzstan (and in other Central Asian countries) are constrained by a number of barriers. These include:
• low public awareness about renewable energy in rural communities;
• inappropriate institutional and regulatory frameworks in the power sector, which have not been designed with renewables in mind;
• inadequate access to bank credits and other sources of finance.

In response to these problems, legislation ‘On Renewable Energy’ and ‘Rules for connecting small hydropower stations to the transmission network’ has been developed in Kyrgyzstan, following extensive consultations with NGO, private-sector, and local-government representatives. Booklets and posters explaining the benefits and market opportunities in small hydro, as well as how to select and install a small hydropower plant, have been published. A revolving credit facility has been established in Karakol by the “Issyk-Kul Activist” NGO, in order to help improve access to finance for communities and farmers who want to buy a small hydro plant.

As a result of these efforts, pilot production of two types of small hydro facilities (able to produce up to 5 kWt of electricity–for household use) has been launched by local companies. Such mini hydro plants generate enough electricity for full home lighting, heating, working on a computer, or watching TV. Some 13 small hydro plants have been installed in nine villages of the Issyk-Kul region, and local communities have been trained in their proper use.

This experience shows that better access to finance and investments in public awareness, combined with reasonable pay-back periods and ease of installation and use, can make small hydro plants an attractive option for households and communities in rural Kyrgyzstan. When combined with the expansion of biogas and solar technologies, these trends strongly suggest that renewable energy technologies can make an important, sustainable contribution to improving living standards in mountainous and rural communities in Kyrgyzstan, as well as other Central Asian countries.

Edil Bogombayev is Manager for the UNDP project, ‘Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources for Development of Remote Regions of Kyrgyzstan’. Ularbek Mateyev is Component Coordinator for the UNDP programme, ‘Environment Protection for Sustainable Development’.

References:

1 Biogas plants create natural gas from organic waste, leaving by-products that can easily be turned into organic fertilizer. These by-products are typically without even small traces of nitrites and nitrates, pathogenic microbial flora, or even weed seeds.

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Social Inclusion

James Hughes and Ben Slay

© Piotr Malecki/Panos Pictures

© Piotr Malecki/Panos Pictures

Drawing on primary research from an upcoming UNDP report on social inclusion, Susanne Milcher presents initial findings on levels and processes of social exclusion—as well as prospects for social inclusion—in Europe and Central Asia. Hugh Frazer and Eric Marlier argue that efforts to combat social exclusion should be strengthened under the EU’s ‘2020 Agenda’. By contrast, Peter Vermeersch suggests that the ‘Europeanization’ of Roma inclusion issues has been a mixed blessing. Orsolya Lelkes uses tax-benefit models to conclude that flat taxes combined with basic social allowances promote social inclusion better than flat taxes alone. By examining young people who have recently left state care institutions, John Pinkerton concludes that that social inclusion can be an effective social policy instrument—if it reflects the conditions affecting specific marginalized groups.

 

 Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits introduce a series of country/comparative articles by arguing that Hungary since 1990 has pursued a ’welfarist’ social development path, while Latvia has followed a more ’nationalist’ route—with differing social outcomes. On the other hand, Lidija Japec finds that, in most of the Western Balkans, ethnic tensions are perceived to be a smaller threat to social cohesion than differences between rich and poor. Nicola Nixon strikes a similar note in arguing that social exclusion (rather than ethnic tensions) has become more entrenched in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the military conflict ended there 15 years ago. Nicolas Jarraud, John Lewis, and Pembe Mentesh suggest that that reconciliation processes in Cyprus likewise suffer from a ‘social inclusion deficit’. Jelena Tadzic and Danilo Vukovic show how internal cycles of deprivation, illiteracy and poverty combine with external cycles of prejudice and discrimination to perpetuate the social exclusion of Roma in Serbia. Katy Norman and Jürg Staudenmann use experience from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Tajikistan to call for the closer integration of access to water with social inclusion agendas. Nurjemal Jalilova suggests that considerable changes will have to be made to Turkmenistan’s largely unreformed pension system, in order to ensure its longer-term financial sustainability.

 

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Borders

James Hughes, Ben Slay

© Witold Krassowski/Panos Pictures

© Witold Krassowski/Panos Pictures

While deep transformations of economic and political institutions have occurred in many regions, they have usually occurred within the framework of pre-existing nation states. Institutions were recast, but borders were not. By contrast, the post-communist transitions of Europe and Central Asia have come with profound geographic and spatial changes. For most countries in this region, everything changed in the early 1990s—including states and state borders.

The subsequent two decades have underscored the continuing importance of the spatial and geographic dimensions of development, and of the region’s new borders. For countries that joined the European Union, EU accession redefined the spatial dimensions of development and statehood. Border posts (with other EU countries) that were constructed upon the acquisition of statehood in the early 1990s were dismantled with these countries’ accession to the EU’s Schengen zone. Large shares of post-accession EU funding take the form of regional development monies (cohesion funding) which reflect a spatial, rather than sectoral, approach to development. Ethnic communities divided by Europe’s new borders have used Euro-regions and other cross-border cooperation modalities to address the challenges created by these borders. Spatial issues likewise remain at the heart of many of the development challenges facing other European and Central Asian countries, be these border management, frozen conflicts, trade integration, or management of trans-boundary ecosystems.

This issue of Development and Transition is therefore devoted to questions of ‘borders’, and the geographic and spatial dimensions of the region’s development challenges. Philip Peirce opens the issue with an overview of the accomplishments, challenges, and lessons learned from the large portfolio of EU border management projects in the former Soviet Union that are implemented by UNDP. Neil Melvin follows with a critical assessment of the state of borders in Central Asia’s Fergana Valley. Talaibek Koichumanov provides an analysis of what the Eurasian Economic Community’s recently introduced customs union could mean for Kyrgyzstan. The challenges of remediating cross-border environmental hot spots in the Western Balkans, and lessons learned from UNDP programming, are described by Snezana Dragojevic. Jens Bastian follows with an analysis of EU-funded cross-border cooperation programmes in the Western Balkans, while Robert Leonardi concludes the issue by exploring the implications of the EU’s cohesion policies for its southern and eastern neighbours.

 

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Goodbye regional development agencies

development agenciesThe recent decision by the government of the United Kingdom to close the country’s regional development agencies (RDAs)1 re-opens an old debate about the best ways to promote regional and local development. At issue is both the appropriate forms and extent of the decentralization of public authority for regional/local development, as well as ways in which the public and private sectors work together. This article briefly describes the British experience with RDAs, and explores the implications for the developing and transition economies of Europe and Central Asia—for whom these issues are quite relevant.2

There is no wonder that sooner or later the British government would have come to such a pitstop. On the other hand, that might be a blatant drawback to halt the institutionalization of the regional tier or even worse to narrow it down to a sort of PPP as newly coined the “local enterprise partnership”. It may be the invisible hand of the free market pushing for de-regulation yields for more flexibility though a more intensive capacity of the local authorities to exert scrutiny over is claimed.

To a large extent, the social accountability would be more into disarray with such a new format.

Then, when it comes to the very roots of the RDAs, the fruitful product of the Europeanization of the EU view to trigger for new tiers of administrations and legislatures (no overtly officially assumed taken on that). Whereas whether we gain or not in terms of maximization of local assets in a quest for local/ (regional?!) development.

Yet, it might be the British government striving to reduce the public expenditure via cuts in the realm of personnel and administrative costs. In the long run, one should expect a turn back to sort of new form of organization that has a direct mandate to harvest the regional economy and boost democratic participation in the build up of one of the most relevant EU policy, the Cohesion one.

As for the Central and Eastern Europe, Romania stands as a case where the RDAs have been if not solid at least the only players to steer shadows of regional policies. Though, substantially involved in the running of the EU programmes , PHARE, and now the newly ERDF, the RDAs have got limited stake in framing regional articulation of public policie and hardly any in reducing the regional economic and social disparities.

The never-ending transition in Romania has proved one aspect for sure: the local public authorities are not ready yet for getting engaged in regional policies design, as worst in developing local public policies to foster development.

Hence, what other kind of organization to work best of the regional development ?I would argue that in the absence of thorough territorial and administrative redesign any new form of organization would do little. Nevertheless, the case of RDAs in Romania brings in a hybrid organization that neither enjoy the full flexibility of an NGO nor the clout of a public authority. It may be delivering good executing of the EU money but definitely is far behind responding to regional needs for social and economic convergence and innovative competitiveness. Cronyism, state-private partnerships voiced as rhetoric, blurred final destinations as from the national growth poles policy that aims at erecting “city regions”, all that is building enough room for RDAs to exist. The actual non-debate on the national administrative division takes us to nowhere – no surprise tough if RDAs would be of any use in Romania.

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How to avoid a housing collapse in Ukraine

The quality of residential housing is a particular concern for many Ukrainians. Housing services—which have a direct impact on the quality of life—are used by virtually everyone on a daily basis. A growing body of evidence suggests that the housing sector is in an advanced state of collapse. Preventing this poses major challenges for Ukraine’s local governments, which are responsible for the management of the country’s housing stock.

What do the numbers say?

Ukraine’s housing sector consists of 1.1 billion square metres of residential space, divided into 19.3 million apartments.1 Around 70 percent of Ukraine’s apartments are located in multi-dwelling buildings, housing approximately 34 million people (more than 80 percent of the population). Some 90 percent of Ukraine’s households own the dwelling in which they live. Five percent live in state or company-provided housing; 2 percent rent from private individuals; while 3 percent live in hostels. Most of these buildings were constructed between the 1950s and 1990s; roughly every third residential building needs renovation.
Many of Ukraine’s residential housing concerns are linked to the quality of communal services—particularly for energy, water, and sanitation. More than 20 percent of the boilers at communal heating facilities have been in use for more than 20 years; 38 percent are classified as extremely inefficient or obsolete. About a third of the pipes in heating networks are likewise in urgent need of replacement. Residential buildings in many communities therefore do not have stable heating supplies; room temperatures during the winter often fall below norms.

This situation results in average levels of energy consumption per unit of service that are well above European averages. Since energy now constitutes more than half of all residential service costs, higher energy prices can mean significant increases in the housing costs. As the data in Chart 1 show, the costs of household and communal services since 2005 have been growing much faster than consumer prices overall. While expenditures on these services may not absorb a large share of the average household’s budget, for low-income households, this share could be significant—and growing.

 

On the other hand, many households (not just poor ones) are not paying their bills. Household arrears to housing service providers, which contract with communal service providers for deliveries of gas, heat, and water, currently stand at 8.7 billion hryvnias ($1.1 billion). Likewise, debts of residential service enterprises are now 8.6 billion hryvnias; including 2.2 billion hryvnias for unpaid gas bills and 2.1 billion hryvnias for unpaid electricity bills.

More than half of Ukraine’s cities with populations over 100,000 have running water only at certain times of the day; some only have hot running water during the winter months (when central heating is provided by municipalities). Much of Ukraine’s water and sanitation equipment is obsolete, having been installed during the Soviet era without regard for efficiency. About 25 percent of the filtering units and 20 percent of the pumps working in water and sewage systems are now beyond their useful operating life. Some 28,000 kilometers (30 percent0 of the country’s water pipes and 9,000 kilometers (27 percent) of Ukraine’s sewage systems are now in an emergency state. Moreover, the number of water supply pipes in this condition is growing by about 3,500 kilometers every year. As a result, water supply losses in some cities are as high as 60 percent, while the energy used to provide a given amount of water and sanitation services can be 3-7 times higher than in Europe. The poor condition of water pipes results in contaminated water supplies and increased risk of infectious disease. The situation is even worse in rural areas, due to inferior access to running water and gas supplies, and longer distances in service provision that boost delivery costs.

While more than 80 percent of individual apartments have been privatized, the establishment of associations to represent the common interests of apartment owners in a given building is moving at a slow pace. At present, such associations have been formed for 15 percent of Ukraine’s multi-unit dwellings. The maintenance of the 85 percent of the privately owned multi-apartment buildings, which do not have established associations of apartment owners, is still with the largely unreformed housing/communal service administrator offices (known as ZhEKs). Moreover, many of the associations that have been formed do not have the institutional capacity needed to effectively discharge their duties. As a result, many apartment buildings remain without an ‘owner’ to protect the interests of their residents.

Housing reform—next steps

Government reform programmes2 envision a number of initiatives in the housing sector. These include:

•    Raising housing and communal service tariffs to cost-recovery levels;
•    The mandatory introduction of apartment owner associations, and household installation of energy and water meters;
•    Creating a fund for financing capital repairs of privatized apartment buildings, to be co-financed by the state and apartment owner associations;
•    Establishing a national support center for these associations, and to train apartment building managers;
•    Significant reductions in household and company debts in the sector; and
•    The modernization of the local housing/communal service administration (ZhEKs).

If successful, these changes would strengthen competition on markets for housing and communal services, and help attract investments in renovation and energy efficiency, in both the housing and communal services sector. However, substantial increases in tariffs, with possible undesirable side effects for low-income households, could also result.

 

UNDP’s Municipal Governance and Sustainable Development Programme

The Municipal Governance and Sustainable Development Programme is one of UNDP’s key community-based development programmes in Ukraine (see Box 1). It helps 29 municipalities in 12 of Ukraine’s 25 regions to respond to these housing sector challenges. Some 50,000 people in the 29 cities have joined the 470 apartment owners’ associations assisted by this programme. These associations are supported through trainings on housing law, management, and finance, as well as on the practical aspects of organizing the renovating multi-dwelling apartment buildings. The programme also encourages cooperation between the associations and local councils on housing renovation and energy saving investments, on the basis of community-led development and cost sharing.

Ensuring that lessons learned in housing reform from this programme feed into national reform processes is an important challenge. Together with the Ministry of Regional Development, Housing, and Construction, the programme is  developing training courses for members and managers of apartment owners’ associations, as well as for local officials in communities seeking to create them. This training and support is based on lessons learned from cities in which these changes have been successfully introduced, such as Zhitomir (see Box 2 below).

 

Oksana Remiga is Senior Programme Manager for the Human Security/Local Development Cluster, UNDP Ukraine.


1 Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
2 These include the 2010-2014 presidential economic reform programme, the government’s 2010-2014 economic reform programme, and the government’s programme for energy savings in the housing and communal services sectors.
3 Based on text provided by Prepared by Jaysingh Sah and Ganna Yatsiuk.
4 For more on this, see http://www.undp.crimea.ua; see Sascha Graumann, ‘Crimea: From Conflict Prevention to Development’, Development and Transition, 23 March 2007.
5 http://www.undp.org.ua/en/local-development-and-human-security.
6 http://www.msdp.undp.org.ua.
7 http://wwba.org.uw.ca.

 

 

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A new definition of local development

local development_imageUNDP recently assessed 126 of its local development projects in 22 European and CIS1 countries, to understand what assets could be used for moving to a new stage of local development for the region.2 In this new stage, local development objectives should encompass collective action for judicious use of natural and other resources and developing human capital (from basic education to management skills and entrepreneurial abilities) to the goals of adequate service delivery, maintaining cultural heritage and environmental assets, and creating sustainable livelihoods.3

Compared to other regions, the CIS context for local development is particularly challenging because, prior to the 1990s, there was no recent tradition of democracy or market economy. This has implications for what can be done in a certain timeframe. Social capital constituting entrepreneurs, active communities, trust between communities and local governments, confidence of local governments, and member associations are some of the essential elements for transitioning to the next stage of development.

UNDP assistance in this region has created these missing elements through support to SMEs and other income-generating activities, and participatory decision-making, particularly in micro-projects.4 The micro-projects have addressed critical service delivery needs through small infrastructure investments, often with matching contributions from beneficiary communities. To UNDP’s credit, the projects have been customized to particular local contexts; project staff members have built a rapport with local stakeholders.

Achievements included improvements in service delivery and basic infrastructure, and a greater understanding on the part of local officials of the need to include the community in budget and investment decisions. Another result is a stronger capacity of local governments in terms of efficiency and accountability. Collectively, these achievements form a base for moving forward.

The pilot legacy

In many cases, however, communities or local governments cannot sustain initiatives begun under UNDP projects because they do not have the needed resources (human, technical, financial, physical), and they are unable to attract non-donor resources. The metaphorical chicken gets fed, but the area around him cannot support it in the future. In practice, scalability or replication rarely happens; many beneficiaries seem to have the problem of sustaining their own achievements through time and as processes clearly embedded in the dynamics of their development.

The assessment found that these projects typically focused on a particular municipality or set of municipalities, without creating institutional, financial and/or economic links for supporting these initiatives. The most common stakeholder was the local government (75 percent of projects). Less than one third of the projects simultaneously engaged stakeholders at levels above and below local governments, such as district or regional government agencies, local civil society organizations or business associations.

Much of UNDP’s work has been with small, rural municipalities that have little hope of moving beyond donor assistance if they remain isolated from the economic dynamics of the region in which they are located. Do municipalities have knowledge of labour and product market trends in nearby urban areas? Can they benefit from more sophisticated human and technical resources in neighbouring municipalities, e.g., for monitoring land degradation, delivering services, or processing agricultural produce? In the new stage of local development, there must be a concentrated effort on connecting them to resources in other municipalities as well as public and private institutions at the meso and national level.

Projects employing the value chain approach (such as a regional aid for trade project in Central Asia and a value chains employment project in Bosnia and Herzegovina) make this connection through private sector actors. However, they do not always involve relevant government counterparts that could support with infrastructure, resource conservation strategies or agricultural extension services. Several Western Balkan countries have employed inter-municipal cooperation tools to create meso-level conditions5 for achieving economies of scale not possible at lower levels. Inter-municipal cooperation connects local governments, but can also involve private sector actors such as through a concession or contracting out of services.

In a few cases, longstanding projects have evolved from the implementation of micro-projects to creating financially sustainable solutions involving the private sector or working with meso-level government bodies on developing the region’s comparative advantages. In the case of the Crimea Integration and Development Programme, private district-level water service companies provide community water associations with advanced technical support, while districts are using renewable energy to solve infrastructure obstacles to non-coastal tourism.

An interlocking design

Although different methodological approaches to local development are used in the region,6 they have much in common, including a focus on community participation and the intention to move from a pilot to programme model and become integrated in approach. What is sometimes missing, however, is a thorough analysis of the set of problems particular to a territory that is incorporated into the programme design to make clear how synergies will be created among the different programming areas. In addition to fleshing out synergies, attention must be paid to the sequencing of interventions based on human or social capital prerequisites.7

The assessment found that numerous activities happening at the local level were not connected. Instead of programmes addressing multiple development dimensions—economic productivity, participation and inclusion, energy management, environmental protection—projects were more typically dedicated to a single dimension.8 Only a third of the projects encompassed two or more dimensions. Some of these multi-dimensional projects addressed economic issues together with service delivery improvement or planning and budgeting.9 Other projects addressed energy management or environmental protection together with planning and civil society development.10By contrast, the Bulgarian project ‘Grassland biodiversity conservation through support for the traditional local economy’ was one of only a few projects that looked at environmental and economic issues together.

The fragmentation of project objectives was recognized and addressed in some countries even before the assessment was undertaken. For example, the Communities Programme in Tajikistan has from the first sought to integrate UNDP project activities conducted in the same geographical area. Coordination among activities was initially improved by designating staff to be focal points of all activities in a particular region. This was followed by the realization that coordination was only the first step, and that conceptual links among these projects were needed. For example, because municipal service delivery, job creation, and sustainable livelihoods required energy, promotion of small-scale renewable energy became a cornerstone of local development activities. The lesson learned is that to get to the next stage of local development, the project design needs to not just identify components, but connect these components to a specific territory and identify causal relationships between them.

From micro to meso and national

The Crimea Integrated Development Programme shows that projects focused on community level activities can evolve so that they engage meso-level stakeholders. In contrast, the engagement of meso-level stakeholders was part of the project design of the community-based approach to local development in Ukraine; buy-in from meso-level stakeholders was a prerequisite for working in a particular district. By requiring commitments from regional- and district-level governments not only in terms of staff and office space, but also certain processes, the project created a platform that has been used in non-project contexts as well to identify and support priority investments at the village level.

These interventions should also be supported by national level policy reform, to create financial incentives for replication and legitimize what is being done at the local level. Sectoral projects have the advantage of working on priority issues with a dedicated ministry to set up systems that will support the interventions. The ‘Sustainable management of peatlands’ project in Belarus, for example, was able to develop comprehensive national-level policy support, including an action programme, technical codes, and methodological recommendations, for sustainable peatland management.11

Many local development projects that focus on a particular region do not focus on creating the policy structure to maintain the initiative. This is most likely to succeed, however, when there is an intention from the beginning to create methodological or policy support for ongoing interventions. For example, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the ‘Support for decentralization reform’ project set as a goal the creation of a methodology for preparing regional development plans; the methodology was adopted by the government and utilized for other regions beyond the pilot regions assisted by UNDP. However, this happened after the end of the project, which emphasizes that the typical project cycle is insufficient to create a sustainable policy framework to support initiatives.12

Governance as a connecting thread

The assessment found that involvement of multiple stakeholders in projects was generally for isolated activities, and therefore did not create national and local level policy linkages. Vertical integration can be strengthened by working with public and private sector organizations that can lobby for national policy change. With this in mind, the ‘Joint integrated local development programme’ in Moldova is helping the congress of local authorities to play a more active role in the country’s decentralization process. By reflecting the needs and capacities of its members nationwide, member associations play a critical role in scaling up initiatives.

As the challenges being addressed under local development initiatives expand, so must the scope of the accompanying work on participatory and legitimate governance. Communities may become empowered by implementing micro-projects and learning about participatory budgeting. But are they consulted in decisions regarding the community’s land, water, and other natural resources? A greater emphasis on local environmental governance would strengthen citizens’ understanding of the economic and health dimensions of their natural resources and environment—and the risks posed to it by economic development. The ‘Conservation of biodiversity and sustainable land use management in Dragash’ project in Kosovo13 is involving the local community in developing a management plan for a neighbouring national park that may expand to their municipality’s territory. This is a typical case of good laws on public participation not being implemented without an extra push, in this case from UNDP.

Investing in development

New challenges posed by climate change must be reconciled with more traditional challenges of inclusive economic growth and accountability in governance systems. Future work would benefit from several investments in this respect. First, as part of designing a new project, an assessment of assets from previous projects should be combined with a multi-dimensional analysis of the developmental processes (and critical obstacles) particular to that region. Second, a programmatic approach should be adopted to bring a long-term view to the partnerships, capacity development, and social capital needed to support development goals. This entails greater complexity in project design, in order to identify and measure intermediate results (and their interrelationships) that lead to final outcomes. It also includes defining the role of meso-level partners to achieve scale, sustainability and a supporting national policy framework. The local government remains the central stakeholder as the logical institutional entrée to engaging communities (including the business community), but assistance provided should mature to focus on systemic improvements at the departmental level. Third, the capacity of those implementing these initiatives needs to be developed so that they bring a multi-sectoral understanding of potential and constraints.

Clare Romanik is UNDP Policy Specialist for Decentralization and Local Governance.


1 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)2 Germán Correa-Díaz, ‘Assessment of Local Development Projects in Eastern Europe and CIS’, February 2011. The author of this article was the originator and chief reviewer of the assessment.

3 This definition draws on different local development theories, including ‘concerted collective action’ emphasized by Gabi de Ottati in Giacomo Becattini et al., From Industrial Districts to Local Development (2003) and ‘production of specific knowledge and resources’ from Gioacchino Garofoli, in ‘Local Development in Europe: Theoretical Models and International Comparisons’ in European Urban and Regional Studies (2002).

4 The term micro-projects refers to community selected and supported small investments to rehabilitate infrastructure or other ways to improve quality of life.

5 In fact this approach is particularly relevant where meso level government does not exist.

6 These include area-based development, community-based development, integrated local development, and integrated strategic planning.

7 For example, the Georgian project ‘Support to the modernization of vocational education and training system’ learned that development of particular skills needed to meet market demands should be mainstreamed into local development projects.

8 However, almost all of the conflict prevention and recovery projects involved other dimensions. For example, Alliance for cultural tourism in Eastern Anatolia (economic productive issues;) Conflict prevention and mitigation in the Ferghana valley (economic and environmental issues), Community development program in Hadareni Village in Romania (integration of minorities).

9 Examples include ‘Kukes region tourism and environment promotion’ in Albania, the ‘Srebrenica regional recovery programme’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Regional development in the Kakheti region’ in Georgia, and ‘Enhancement of living standards in the Ferghana Valley’ in Uzbekistan.

10 Examples include ‘Sustainable development at local level’ in Belarus, ‘Community-based local development’ in Ukraine, and ‘Support to sustainable spatial planning and development in northern municipalities’ in Montenegro.

11 Floris Deodatus, Terminal evaluation of Renaturalization and sustainable management of peatlands in Belarus to combat land degradation, ensure conservation of globally valuable biodiversity, and mitigate climate change, December 2010.

12 Tomislav Novovic, Review of the project Support to the Decentralization Reform in FYR Macedonia on its path to EU, April 2011.

13 As per UN Security Council resolution 1244.

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From apathy to hope: local development in Armenia

Like many developing and transition economies in Europe and Central Asia, Armenia experienced a decline in its national poverty rate from 51 percent in 2001 to 23.5 percent in 2008; extreme poverty fell even faster (from 16 percent in 2001 to 3 percent in 2008). 2008 household survey data also revealed declines in income inequality: the Gini coefficient in 2008 had fallen to 0.389, from 0.535 in 2001.

However, in the 10 years prior to the onset of the global economic crisis in 2009, regional disparities within Armenia increased along with the country’s economic growth, which was largely driven by the rapid development of the capital. Yerevan’s share in Armenia’s GDP grew from 42 percent in 1999 to almost 60 percent in 2009, while even as the share of the population living in Yerevan remained essentially unchanged at 35 percent.

These growing disparities reflect the concentration of construction and trade activities in the capital, combined with the decline of the agricultural sector—which is the main income source for households in many other regions. They also reflect the absence of a comprehensive regional development policy; while elements of such a policy have been introduced by various state agencies, a comprehensive, consistent approach has yet to be adopted. Local governance reform is part of this challenge: despite some important successes with decentralization, de facto autonomy and capacity in many municipalities remains far from adequate. Public interest in participating in local governance and development is also limited; many citizens believe that local governments can do little to improve the quality of their lives.

As a result, many local communities are trapped in vicious circles of poverty, unemployment, poor access to basic services, apathy, and hopelessness. This was the case even before the 14 percent decline in Armenia’s GDP that was recorded in 2009. Low rural living standards in turn serve as a ‘push’ factor responsible for rural outmigration (both to Yerevan and abroad), particularly for young men. Armenia’s rural development challenges are increasingly acquiring gender dimensions: men are more likely to migrate in search of work, while women are increasingly likely to be heads of single-parent households. The complexities and linkages of these regional development challenges require an integrated regional/local development response.

UNDP and integrated local development in Armenia

Since 2001, through its community development, results-based budgeting, vocational education and training, and support to small and medium-sized enterprises projects, UNDP has supported local economic development in over 300 Armenian communities. These projects directly benefited more than 250,000 people living in remote communities. Some $17 million have been programmed through these initiatives, thanks to support from the Italian, Norwegian, Japanese, Danish, US and UK governments, as well as from the Armenian diaspora (and from UNDP’s own funds). This approach to local development, which focuses on the design and implementation of local development programmes, integrates a number of factors, including:

•    Broad public participation, to foster a sense of local ownership and the belief that things can improve;
•    The use of results-based local budgeting methodologies (in 13 communities), to increase the transparency of local public finance;
•    Support for local economic development in communities located in border regions;
•    An emphasis on supporting the most vulnerable households in a given community; and
•    Providing this support in an integrated manner, along with microfinance support.

The outcomes of these projects include:

•    Improved access to energy, water, and sanitation services;
•    The creation of new employment and income generation opportunities—especially in agro- and food processing (95 projects) and construction;
•    Support for business start-ups (more than 600 start-up entrepreneurs have been trained, 140 of whom received $450,000 in micro credits; some 290 new workplaces were created), including better access to finance;
•    Improvements in local infrastructure (in 120 locations); and
•    Better management of natural resources and local ecological resources.

Case study: Lusadzor

Lusadzor, a rural community in the Tavush region, is located on the border with Azerbaijan, some 145 kilometres from Yerevan. Border communities in this region are among Armenia’s most disadvantaged, due to the Armenian-Azeri armed conflict and socio-economic hardships of 1990s. Almost two thirds of the 270 households residing in the village are engaged in farming, cultivating potatoes, grains, tobacco, fruit and walnuts, as well as producing honey, wool, milk, meat and eggs. They work small plots of land (on average 0.7 hectares in size), due in part to inadequate access to irrigated water and fertilizer. Large tracts of arable land in Lusadzor have therefore reverted to meadows and pasture. Most of these products are consumed by the producing households; due to limited transport and marketing options, farm output that is not consumed locally, is typically sold at a discount to wholesalers, or is transported to the nearest market at self-expense.

Work in Lusadzor started in May 2007, within the framework of the government’s rural poverty eradication programme then in force. With $800,000 in financial support from the government of Italy during 2007-2009, UNDP was able to implement all of the infrastructure, agricultural and agro-processing projects that had been prioritized under Lusadzor’s 2007-2008 community development plan. Examples of this infrastructure development include:

•    Water supply: Lusadzor’s water system had been based on Soviet-era infrastructure, the main pipleline for which had a 75 percent loss rate. In the absence of reliable water supplies, Lusadzor residents used spring water. In 2009, a new water mainline, with a 6.2 kilometer piping feeder system and a pumping station, was constructed with UNDP assistance, and reservoirs were renovated. As a result, all Lusadzor residents today have access to clean, potable water.

•    Farm infrastructure: 2.5 kilometres of irrigation network (metal piping, canals, pumping stations) were constructed, significantly reducing water losses and making possible the irrigation of 45 hectares of privately owned orchards. The construction of 28 greenhouses led to year-round vegetable production, increasing annual farm incomes by about 15 percent ($700 per household). UNDP also helped set up a cooperative kitchen for food processing, and conducted several vocational/ agronomical trainings, with a focus on packaging and branding and sales. Following the construction of this infrastructure, UNDP helped local households to boost agricultural production, agro-processing, and market sales. Some 52 hectares of arable lands were put back into cultivation thanks to UNDP provision of seed, fertilizers, and agronomical expertise. As a result, 136 rural households produced an additional 100 tons of grain per year, boosting their incomes by some 7 percent.

•    Gas supply: With UNDP assistance, 4.8 kilometers of gas pipeline infrastructure was installed in Lusadzor, thanks to which natural gas is now supplied to over 180 households.

•    Forestry and animal husbandry: Aged and low-yield privately-owned fruit gardens (pears and apples) in the community were replaced with newly planted orchards; over 11,000 seedlings were distributed to households. Lusadzor’s overall fruit crop is expected to reach 1,000 tons per annum in the coming years, a 20 percent increase. Support for cattle breeding (via training for local technicians, distribution of artificial insemination equipment) was also included in the programme, benefitting some 120 rural households.

•    Social infrastructure: Lusadzor’s decrepit community centre, which had been built in 1962, was completely renovated with UNDP support. New additions included a library containing 3,000 books, an IT centre, and a games room. As well as meeting the cultural needs of Lusadzor’s youth, the centre has helped revitalize the community’s cultural life.

•    Business development: Training courses for start-up businesses were provided to interested community residents, providing them with basic knowledge of business planning, tax legislation, marketing, and other management tools needed to start (or formalize) small businesses.

•    Integrated climate risk management: Lusadzor was selected under a UNDP regional climate change adaptation programme as a pilot for integrated climate risk management. Based on official data and interviews with local community members, such measures as improving early warning of weather risks, identification of appropriate farmers’ coping strategies, and ensuring that infrastructure projects reflect consideration of climatic hazards were pursued. As a result of this exercise, local seasonal forecasting improved (e.g. flood early warning, weather forecasting, etc.); and farmers’ coping and adaptation strategies were elaborated through community meetings and farmer trainings.

As a result of these measures, UNDP and independent experts estimate that the income of Lusadzor households increased on average by 35 percent. According to the same estimates, the income increase will be sustained at least for the coming 5-7 years. Perhaps more importantly, these projects helped Lusadzor to overcome years of neglect and hopelessness, which had been drivers of out-migration from this (and neighbouring) community(s). These projects helped the community to escape the vicious circle of poverty and low expectations. They raised not only incomes, but also hopes of a better future.

 

Beyond Lusadzor: Replication in other vulnerable communities

UNDP programming is becoming something of a local development benchmark in Armenia. This is apparent in the government’s 2010 request that UNDP draft a policy document on balanced regional development, to reduce disparities between the capital and the regions through integrated local development. Prior to this, UNDP’s work on the ground fed into national policy formulation via contributions to Armenia’s sustainable development programme, its agricultural development strategy, and the anti-crisis programme (to mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis). These developments have also encouraged state agencies, and other local and international organizations, to adopt or support this integrated local development approach. For example, community development projects implemented by the quasi-governmental ‘Hayastan-All Armenian Fund’ in surrounding villages are based on the Lusadzor example.
UNDP is also replicating the Lusadzor approach (albeit on a smaller scale) in order to revive communities along the border with Georgia (in the northern Ashotsk sub-district of Shirak region), as well as galvanizing cross-border cooperation between the two countries. The Bavra, Saragyugh, Sizavet, and Tavshut communities—which suffered greatly from the devastating earthquake of 1988 as well as from socio-economic hardships of the 1990s—have been the focus of UNDP’s integrated local development work in Armenia since 2008. With support from the government of Norway, UNDP’s community development project supported the establishment of a $300,000 agricultural machinery pool (tractors, bailers, seeders, ploughs), managed by a community-based organization established especially for this purpose. Some 1,500 farm households now benefit from this machinery, which has made possible increased local cultivation of grain, potatoes, and other crops.

The results from Lusadzor and Bavra have led the UN system to scale up its support for integrated local development programming in the Geghamasar and Pambak communities (with large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons) in the Gegharkunik region, thanks to financial support from the UN Human Security Trust Fund. This two-year $2 million project, which was initiated in April 2009, supports improvements in strategic planning and operational management in these communities. It also finances human capital acquisition for 565 vulnerable households, to promote income generation and increase opportunities for start-up businesses. About 400 families have been selected for vocational/agronomical trainings. These efforts in Geghamasar were supported by UNDP procurement of 100 tons of wheat seed and 62 tons of fertilizers, as well as a tractor and a plough. Residents of Pambak and its environs have received 125 cows, a tractor, a plough, a grain seeder, a bailer, a cultivator, a combine harvester, as well as artificial insemination equipment and high-quality semen. During the first year of project implementation, household incomes increased by an average of $170 or 17 percent. The subsequent availability of high quality locally produced seeds could more than double these incomes again.

Conclusions

Deprivation in Armenia’s rural communities reflects a dearth of economic opportunity, as well as inadequate access to quality health, social and educational services. If urgent measures to address these challenges and prevent further rural outmigration are not undertaken, the fabric of rural society could be further undermined, and the numbers of vulnerability households could grow. While not a panacea, integrated local development programming—such as the kind implemented by UNDP in Lusadzor and other vulnerable communities—can certainly be part of the answer.

 

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The ‘Cserehat model’: Area-based development and Roma inclusion

This article presents lessons learned during the six years in which the ‘Cserehat programme’1 for integrated local development has been working in one of northeastern Hungary’s poorest regions. This programme represents a departure from conventional development programming, in that it has replaced sectoral, top-down approaches with a focus on area-based capacity development in order to help marginalized communities.

Conventional local economic development programming focuses primarily on attracting private capital and infrastructure funding, from government or EU sources. Promoting economic growth is the main goal. Such programming is often technocratic and commercial in nature, and beneficiaries are often separated from the design and implementation of the development projects pursued. When such programming embraces participatory processes, it often starts with the preparation of a strategy, which can exclude beneficiaries without strong educational backgrounds or experience—or who are put off by ‘development jargon’.

However, in many cases such approaches need to be supplemented by alternative local development initiatives that focus on sustaining and rebuilding livelihoods, non-profit financial and social services, small-scale energy production and infrastructure development, micro-farming, and the like. Empowering communities to solve their own problems, and protecting the quality of life, are the main goals of this approach.

The Cserehat programme represents a successful application of this approach to local development.

Why Cserehat?

Despite substantial investments in regional development, territorial disparities are increasing in many new member states of the European Union, as well as in Southeast European countries that are currently negotiating for EU membership. These disparities can be largest at the micro-region (NUTS 4) level,2 where multiple social, economic, and infrastructure shortfalls are often present (see Box 1). In addition, Hungary faces problems posed by the growing territorial segregation of marginalized Roma communities in poor areas.

Located in economically depressed northeastern Hungary with a population of 100,000, the Cserehat micro-region suffers from unemployment rates that run as high as 50 percent in some areas. While the 2001 census found that Roma made up 2 percent of Hungary’s population, their share in Cserehat was 15 percent—and has likely risen in the intervening decade. Poverty and social exclusion are particular issues among Roma youth; one study found that 14-18 years-olds comprise 80 percent or more of the population in Cserehat’s most vulnerable Roma communities.3Access to social services and information is often poor; initiatives to raise household incomes and mediate local ethnic tensions are very important. Roma and non-Roma residents in many of Cserehat’s 114 local communities suffer from vicious cycles of poverty, exclusion, low expectations, and apathy.

•    Social inclusion of disadvantaged Roma and other vulnerable communities, with a particular focus on women, children, and the elderly;
•    Mobilization of local resources for employment and income generation, business development, and small infrastructure projects; and
•    Strengthening local communities’ abilities to attract and absorb national government (and potentially EU) funds for regional development.

The programme’s $2.8 million in initial funding ($300,000 from UNDP, $2.5 million from the Hungarian government) was not large, in comparison either with other initiatives or with the scale of Cserehat’s problems. The programme’s value can be seen in the funds raised from other sources, including $5 million from EU funds and the Norwegian government. Moreover, the Hungarian government scaled up the Cserehat programme to create a $640 million national local integrated development programme, for implementation during 2009-2013. Some $40 million of these funds were allocated to the Cserehat programme. Perhaps more important than the money raised has been the application of the integrated development paradigm combined with the mobilization of social capital and capacity development activities for local stakeholders within a given area. These included:

•    Community coaching and global grants, to empower poor people and mobilize resources at the local level;
•    Mapping local partners and development ideas in line with partnership building;
•    Grant schemes to help poor households and to leverage local resources;
•    Establishing a social resource centre to serve as a local organizational facility, a place for information dissemination (inter alia regarding resource mobilization opportunities);
•    Special planning processes to ensure participation of vulnerable groups.

 

Programme principles and methodology 

The programme’s starting point was the principle that the resources and solutions to Cserehat’s socio-economic problems could be found locally—‘all in one place’. This principle spoke to the need to apply integrated, flexible processes that simultaneously empower disadvantaged communities, confront ethnic tensions and prejudice, create jobs, introduce more sustainable environmental practices, and promote gender equality, while also developing solutions for the special problems facing the region’s youth.

This principle has been realized by a focus on developing capacities through an integrated area-based development process, rather than on designing, managing, and financing detached projects. Within this framework, key operational principles include:

•    Participation and social organization. Effective area-based development programming requires community engagement in its design and implementation. In addition to providing information, training, advice, and funds, the programme invested in expanding Roma communities’ ambition, skills, and organizational networks;

•    Development is for everyone. Local development should include everyone in a community, including the most vulnerable. Everyone has ideas and can contribute. The mission is to create the capacity of locals to transform their perceived needs into projects. Experts should not tell people how to live, or what to do. Learning is an interaction among equals.

•    Better communication. The programme established a social resource centre that serves as an information and coordination hub. It focuses on conveying best practices across the region; bringing in helpful partners; and enabling people and organizations within and outside the region to communicate with each other.

•    Start small. Working with people with no development experience, the first actions have to be small-scale, reflecting local actors’ limited capacity. The first step might indeed be very small, like buying a football and shoes or organizing a village day for local Roma. But activities can rapidly grow, as actors gain confidence and skills under the guidance of the coach. Their small size helps local communities to ‘own’ and benefit from the programme.

•    Co-financing. The poorest households often face the greatest difficulties in accessing project funding because they are unable to put up co-financing. The Cserehat programme therefore set up a special $700,000 co-financing fund, to supplement the resources of the poorest localities for larger projects drawn up with community participation. This fund helped local beneficiaries to attract some $5 million in additional financing during 2008-2010.

The programme formula consists of the following steps:5

1)    Identify an area that is suffering from regional disparities, and is suitable in size for inclusion in the programme.

2)    Put in place a community coach and a team working with all relevant local stakeholders, in order to make things happen.

3)    Mobilize local communities and conduct capacity development activities.

4)    Bring representatives of marginalized groups together with other community members, including public and business representatives and civil society organizations, in order to foster mutual communication, reduce ethnic tensions, and support local partnerships. Diverging interests can be reconciled via the creation of a local action plan, which is less sophisticated than a full strategy, but closer to the participants’ reality. These plans are formally approved by both the local communities in Cserehat and by the national authorities.

5)    Generate activities and projects that engage the resources present in the region and the energies of local communities, including the poor and vulnerable.

6)    Create a structure for effective partnerships between the different stakeholders in local development. Their capacity to do local development without outside assistance is needed to ensure the sustainability of the process of local development.

7)    Ensure that the process is sustainable and ‘localized’ by pursuing the programme over a period of time.

Programme results and lessons learned

Thanks to the Cserehat programme 60 Roma self-help groups were established, and networked together, in Cserehat’s 114 local communities. Some 1400 jobs were created (50 percent of which were filled by Roma), including via the establishment or expansion of 43 social enterprises (90 percent of which provided employment for Roma). Under the 116 projects supported by the programme’s grant schemes, some 2,500 local development partners were mobilized and their activities mapped out. The creation of green jobs via energy efficiency, water management, and nature protection projects was a major focus of these projects, as was better access to information, innovative social services, housing, small business formation, and community economic development. In addition, a website and the Independent Roma News Agency were established.

Perhaps the programme’s most important accomplishments lie in its challenges to beliefs that the poor and vulnerable have no good ideas for improving their own lives, and can therefore be ignored in the design and implementation of projects from which they are to benefit. Instead, the Cserehat programme shows that development should be done with, rather than for (or to) beneficiaries. It also challenges the assumption that mainstream economic development is the sole or most important driver in eliminating territorial disparities. The programme shows how local resources and energy can be mobilized to help development take hold in disadvantaged communities—which can in turn bring these communities closer to mainstream development processes.

Marta Marczis, who works as an adviser on area-based and cross-border development for UNDP’s Bratislava Regional Centre, designed the Cserehat programme and served as the programme’s chief technical adviser.

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